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Look-Alike Drugs: Eliminating a
Profitable Loophole in Existing
Drug Laws
I. Introduction
Black beauties, yellow jackets, Christmas trees, pink footballs-
these terms are common street names for amphetamines,' a major
component of the drug abuse problem present in the United States.2
A recent aspect of amphetamine abuse has eluded solution by law
enforcement officers. The problem concerns "look-alike" drugs,3
stimulants that resemble illicit amphetamines' in size, shape, color
and markings, but contain only noncontrolled, and therefore legal
substances.5 Because look-alikes resemble amphetamines, buyers
often mistakenly purchase look-alikes, and not the amphetamines
they represent. Consequently, individuals engaged in the look-alike
industry capitalize on the illicit drug market free from the risk of
criminal prosecution.'
Manufacturers and distributors of look-alikes currently profit
from a loophole in existing drug laws. These laws confine the prohi-
bition of illegal trafficking to controlled substances. Accordingly,
state and federal officials cannot constrain street level distributors
1. Amphetamines are a group of synthetic chemicals that stimulate the central nervous
system. MELLONI'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 15 (1979). Properly used. amphet-
amines have a legitimate medical purpose and are especially useful in alleviating allergy and
cold symptoms. BLAKISTON'S NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 61 (2d ed. 1956). Because
of their strong stimulant effect, a substantial black market exists for amphetamines diverted
from legitimate channels of medical treatment. Recognizing the potential for abuse of am-
phetamines, Congress has provided for their regulation under the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1981). The Act regulates legitimate use of specified
schedules of drugs and controls illicit trafficking in these substances. The drugs listed within
each schedule are known as controlled substances.
2. Treffert & Joranson, Resiricting Amphelamines, J.A.M.A. (Journal of the American
Medical Association), Apr. 3, 1981, at 1336.
3. For purposes of this comment, the term "look-alike," which also has been applied to
generic drugs, will refer only to those drugs having outward appearances that mirror con-
trolled substances, but have contents containing only noncontrolled ingredients.
4. Amphetamine look-alikes constitute a major portion of the look-alike market. Re-
cently, however, look-alike barbiturates and prescription sedatives, such as quaaludes, have
begun to appear. Stecklow, From an Unlikely Pa. Mill Town, a Flourishing Bogus Drug Trade,
The Washington Star, Feb. 15, 1981, at A-I [hereinafter cited as From an Unlikely Pa. Mill
Town]; Pa. Dep't of Health Fact Sheet (Aug. 31, 1981). Look-alike drugs also have appeared
in cocaine form. Parker, Look-Alikes, the New 'Speed, din publications, May 1981.
5. See infra notes 16-17.
6. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
and dealers of look-alikes.7 Moreover, manufacturers and wholesale
distributors properly label the look-alikes with dosage and warnings,
thereby complying with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) la-
beling requirements.8
The recent proliferation of the look-alike industry,9 accompa-
nied by increased enforcement' 0 and health" problems, has engen-
dered widespread publicity and public awareness of the problem.
Increased pressure has caused state and federal governments to
move toward eliminating the problem. Within the last year, fifteen
states enacted legislation designed to ban the sale of look-alikes,' 2
with others expected to follow.' 3 In addition, the federal govern-
ment, through provisions of the Postal Reorganization Act' 4 and the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,' 5 has attempted to deal with
the problem.
This comment will review various state and federal efforts to
control the look-alike industry. After an initial presentation of the
problems associated with look-alike drugs, a discussion and critique
of the newly enacted state statutes, as well as an evaluation of the
effectiveness of federal efforts, is provided. This discussion and eval-
uation will illustrate the need for a uniform federal law providing
coordination of federal and state law enforcement efforts.
II. Background
A. A Booming New Industry
Look-alike drugs are capsules or tablets that contain noncon-
trolled, over-the-counter' 6 drug ingredients,' 7 but closely resemble' 8
7. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
8. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concerns itself with adulteration and
misbranding of food and drugs. FDA laws, and the programs designed to implement them,
focus mainly on legitimate products, including legal prescription and nonprescription drugs.
The prime concern of the FDA is at the manufacturing and distribution levels. In the con-
trolled substances area, the FDA's authority is limited to providing the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), which enforces the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, with scientific
support for the scheduling of potential abuse drugs. Problem of Look-Alike Drugs: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-3
(1981) (statement of Joseph P. Hile, Assoc. Comm'r for Regulatory Affairs, FDA) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
9. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
1i. See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
12. See in/ra note 60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-62.
14. 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1980).
15. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1981).
16. Over-the-counter drugs are drugs available without a prescription for self-medication
by consumers. J. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL §13.08 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
MANUAL]. Conversely, prescription drugs, those with potentially harmful effects, can be dis-
pensed lawfully only upon a physician's prescription. United States v. Various Articles of
Drugs Consisting of Unknown Quantities of Prescription Drugs, 332 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1964).
17. Look-alike stimulant drugs most commonly contain caffeine, phenylpropanolamine,
well-known, controlled substances.' 9 Manufacturers and distribu-
tors properly label look-alike drugs2" with warnings, precautions,
dosage, and use information.2" Sellers on the street, however, re-
move the pills from their containers and sell the look-alikes devoid
of labeling, as the controlled substances they imitate.22
The counterfeit drug industry offers a tremendous monetary in-
centive. Prices23 from distributors range from $19 to $150 for a
container of one thousand pills.24 Sold individually on the street as
amphetamines, the look-alikes cost $0.50 to $1.50 apiece,25 yielding a
profit of approximately $1000 on each bottle of pills. More impor-
tantly, because look-alike drugs contain legal contents, manufactur-
ers, distributors and dealers can capitalize on the illicit drug trade
ephedrine sulfate, or a combination of these substances. Hearings Before the House Select
Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1981) (statement of Joseph
P. Hile, Assoc. Comm'r for Regulatory Affairs, FDA); L. Golden, Trafficking in Look-Alikes;
an Update (Nov. 2, 1981) (available from Office of Intelligence, DEA) [hereinafter cited as
Trafficking in Look-Alikes]. Diet pills and cold remedies sold without prescription commonly
contain these ingredients. Cooper, Flood of "Look-Alike' Drugs Appears to Have Receded in
Maryland, The Baltimore Sun, Dec. 10, 1981, at B7.
Look-alike depressants contain salicylamide (aspirin), doxylamine (an antihistamine),
acetaminophen (a mild pain reliever) and chlorpheniramine (an allergy medicine and antihis-
tamine). Bachman, Deception Basis of a Real Problem, Centre Daily Times (State College,
PA), Nov. I1, 1981, at 1; see also Bernoski, Drug Disguise The Times Leader (Wilkes-Barre,
PA), Oct. 26, 1981, at I, col. 4.
18. The exterior of look-alikes mimic amphetamines and barbiturates in their color, size
and shape. The capsules or tablets also contain symbols and markings similar to, but not
identical with, those found on actual controlled substances. The Times Leader (Wilkes-Barre,
PA), Oct. 26, 1981, at 1, col. 4; Pa. Dep't of Health Fact Sheet, (Aug. 31, 1981).
19. See supra note 1. For a listing of substances scheduled by the federal government for
control, see 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1981).
20. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1972) provides in
pertinent part:
A drug or device shall be deemed to be misbranded-
(f) unless its labeling bears (1) adequate directions for use; and (2) such adequate
warnings against use in those pathological conditions or by children where its use
may be dangerous to health, or against unsafe dosage or methods or duration of
administration or application, in such manner and form, as are necessary for the
protection of users....
Id § 352.
The Act also requires that labeling include, inter alia, the established name and quantity
of each ingredient in the drug; the name and business location of the manufacturer or distribu-
tor; and a warning, if applicable, that the drug may be habit forming. Id § 352(b), (d), (e).
21. Hearings, supra note 8, at 3 (statement of Michael A. O'Pake, Pa. State Senator).
22. Id at I (statement of Marion Hambrick, Assistant Adm'r for Operations, DEA).
23. The prices quoted in this comment existed as of 1981.
24. Hearings, supra note 8, at I (statement of Marion Hambrick, Assistant Adm'r for
Operations, DEA). Currently, the price of look-alike drugs purchased from distributors breaks
down to a cost ranging from 2C to 15€ per pill.
25. id Look-alike quaaludes typically yield a higher price than the amphetamines and
sell for $3 to $4 apiece. Cooper, Look-Alike Drugs.- The Contents Are Legal But Is the Intent,
The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 22, 1981, at B I. Look-alike amphetamines, however, have sold at
prices as high as $8 a pill. Massey, Fake 'Speed' Causes Almost as Much Fear as the Real
Thing, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 4. Presently, no existing laws restrict the number of
capsules a distributor may sell, enabling street dealers to easily obtain look-alikes to sell on the
black market. Bachman, Look-Alike Drugs Easy to Find, Centre Daily Times (State College,
Pa), Nov. 12, 1981, at I.
without risk of prosecution under existing drug laws.26
Basically, the look-alike drug industry operates as a mail order
business focusing primarily on the large market of high school and
college students.27 The legality of the product enables distributors to
conduct an extensive, above-ground advertising campaign utilizing
magazine and newspaper advertisements,28 full color brochures, and
business cards.29 Advertisements characterize look-alike drugs as
body stimulants, alternative energy sources or nighttime analge-
sics-the "safe," legal way to get high." Each advertisement pro-
vides a telephone number or an address through which a customer
can place an order.
3 1
The easy availability of look-alikes, combined with the market-
ing approach of distributors, has caused a virtual boom in the look-
alike industry in recent years. 32 The use of non-amphetamine stimu-
26. The lack of risk in the look-alike industry is being slowly eliminated. Several states
have amended their controlled substances acts to deal with the look-alike problem, see infra
notes 60-61 and accompanying text; other states are attempting to solve the problem under
deceptive trade practices acts or business codes, see infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text;
and federal government agencies are beginning to take action, see infra notes 134-214 and
accompanying text.
27. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 4-6 (statement of Congressman William J. Hughes,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime); see also id at 2 (statement of Marion Hambrick, Assistant
Adm'r for Operations DEA).
28. Trafficking in Look-Alikes, supra note 17. The advertisements apparently are
designed to mislead youthful consumers. The use of photographs of the pills and the use of
names and registration numbers that resemble the actual controlled substance occasion the
deception. The advertisements, literally accurate, have an overall effect that confuses and mis-
leads a young, inexperienced purchaser. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Look-Alike
Drugs of the Pa. Senate Comm. on Health and Welfare, 1981 Sess. 3-4 (testimony of William T.
Murphy, Assistant Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigations, United States Postal Service,
[hereinafter cited as Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drugs]. Many of the
advertisements also suggest that purchasers can make high profits from resales. Lenck, Prefa-
tory Note to MODEL IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (DEA) (Oct. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Prefatory Note].
29. Suggestive business cards are the major advertising technique for most look-alike
distributors. Distributors leave the cards in rest rooms, at truck stops, and on automobile
windshields, or hand them out at football games and concerts. From an Unlikely Pa. Mill
Town, supra note 4, at A-I; see also Bachman, Look-Alike Drugs Easy to Find, Centre Daily
Times (State College, PA), Nov. 11, 1981, at I. The most blatant use of business card advertis-
ing occurred in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during a concert given by the Rolling Stones. Pa-
trons entering the stadium were handed a business card extolling seventy-five "all legal and
hassle free" stimulants and depressants. Moreover, one enterprising manufacturer hired an
airplane to fly over the stadium advertising the firm's available stimulants. Hearings, supra
note 8, at 1 (statement of Michael A. O'Pake, Pa. State Senator).
30. Hearings, supra note 8, at 2-3 (statement of Michael A. O'Pake, Pa. State Senator).
31. Bachman, Look-Alike Drugs Easy to Find, Centre Daily Times (State College, PA),
Nov. 12, 1981, at I.
32. The rapid growth of the look-alike industry also results from the recent scarcity of
amphetamines as a street drug. The FDA has proposed banning the use of amphetamines for
weight control and DEA, which establishes quotas on legal production of commonly abused
drugs, has drastically reduced amphetamine quotas over the past five years. Physicians, conse-
quently, prescribe amphetamines less frequently and the resultant scarcity may be populariz-
ing their look-alike counterparts. -Cooper, Look-Alike Drugs.- The Contents Are Legal But Is
the Intent, The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 22, 1981, at B I.
lants in "street speed"33 began to rise slowly in 1973;34 by 1979, the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was aware of only a
handful of look-alike distributors.35 The industry then grew rap-
idly36 and by the latter part of 1981 over 150 persons distributed
look-alikes nationwide.37 Aggravated difficulties in enforcement of
existing drug laws and increased public health problems have ac-
companied this boom.
B. Aid to Illicit Drug Dealers
The recent proliferation of look-alike drugs has detrimentally
affected successful enforcement of existing drug laws. In the face of
widespread distribution of look-alikes, law enforcement officials fre-
quently cannot distinguish the look-alike from the actual controlled
drug.38 Thus, officials often waste time, money, and manpower pur-
suing illegally distributed controlled drugs, only to find that the sub-
stances seized are look-alike products. 39 Because of the prevalence of
this situation' and the numerous cases that have been dismissed,
officials in some jurisdictions have ceased buying and seizing pills
purported to contain controlled substances.4
33. Hearings Before the Special Subcorum. on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at I
(statement of James A. Stuart, Executive Director, On Drugs, Inc.).
34. Id
35. [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) $ 41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982); see also
Prefatory Note, supra note 28.
36. Trafficking in Look-Alikes, supra note 17. In samples of stimulants analyzed by a
national laboratory in 1969, 65% of the samples contained only amphetamines. By 1975, the
rate dropped to 30.6% and by 1977 the percentage was only 6%. Hearings Before the Special
Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at 1 (statement of James A. Stuart, Executive
Director, On Drugs, Inc.); see also Bachman, Look-Alike Drugs Easy to Find, Centre Daily
Times (State College, PA), Nov. 12, 1981, at I (according to a 1979 national survey, 136 or 94%
of 145 pills analyzed were look-alikes; a 1980 report revealed only one true amphetamine in
136 samples).
37. Nearly two-thirds of the nation's look-alike distributors are located in Pennsylvania,
which has been dubbed the "Look-Alike Drug Capital of the Nation." Hearings, supra note 8,
at I (statement of Michael A. O'Pake, Pa. State Senator); see also The Philadelphia Inquirer,
Feb. 17, 1982, at B3, col. 1 (Pennsylvania is the "look-alike drug center of the nation").
38. Hearings, supra note 8, at 4 (statement by Congressman William J. Hughes, Chair-
man, Subcomm. on Crime).
39. Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1981) (statement by Joseph P. Hile, Assoc. Comm'r for Regulatory Affairs, FDA).
40. In Charlotte, North Carolina, an estimated 50% of the city's drug cases involve legal
amphetamines; in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 90% of alleged amphetamines on the street are
look-alike drugs. Newman, Amphetamine Look-Alikes Creating Havoc, U.S. JOURNAL, Aug.
1981.
41. Prefatory Note, supra note 28. In Anne Arundel County, Maryland, look-alikes have
become so prevalent that undercover officials no longer buy any substances in pill form unless
they can test a sample of the pills before making an arrest. Cooper, Look-Alike Drugs: The
Contents are Legal but Is the Intent, The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 22, 1981, at B i. Local police
departments in Pennsylvania, unable to make the charges hold, attempted to prosecute on the
ground of theft by deception. The courts refused to accept this theory. Consequently, in some
jurisdictions, police have not confiscated any drugs of this nature for a long time. Bachman,
Look-Alike Drugs Easy to Find, Centre Daily Times (State College, PA), Nov. 12, 1981, at 1.
A similar enforcement problem is encountered in schools. Most school drug and alcohol
policies address only possession and use of drugs prohibited by law. Because the law does not
In addition, an arrest for the sale or possession of a controlled
substance can result in a lawsuit for false arrest if the authorities
later determine the substance to be a look-alike drug.42 The threat
of an adverse judgment and the financial burden of providing a de-
fense have increased the reluctance of law enforcement agencies to
participate in these cases.43 The disincentive to enforce existing drug
laws, created by the rapid growth of the look-alike industry, conse-
quently has eased the way for dealers engaged in selling actual con-
trolled substances to avoid arrest.
C The Public Health Problem
An increase in the incidence of look-alike overdoses reported by
hospitals nationwide evidences the recent increase in look-alike drug
trafficking." Both the contents of the drugs45 and their outward ap-
pearance create serious health problems. The manner in which look-
alike drugs reach the ultimate consumer occasions one aspect of the
health problem. The substances, properly labeled 46 by manufactur-
ers and distributors, are relatively safe at the recommended dos-
ages.47 The capsules and tablets, however, resold on the street either
proscribe look-alikes, school officials remain powerless to regulate the use of these drugs
among students. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at
3-4 (statement of Robert G. Bohn, Dist. Superintendent, Mifflin County, PA, School Dist.). In
an effort to remedy the problem, some schools have amended their drug policy to include look-
alike substances. The policies allow an exception for medication issued on the advice of a
physician and used by the authorized person. Metro East, Feb. 16, 1982, at 6, col. 1-2.
42. Hearings, supra note 8, at 4 (statement by Congressman William J. Hughes, Chair-
man, Subcomm. on Crime).
43. Id The problem of false arrest suits became so severe in Daytona Beach, Florida,
that local police stopped making arrests. [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH),J
41,472 (Oct. 26, 1981).
Potential liability from suits alleging wrongful suspension of students also has hampered
the efforts of school administrators to rid their schools of drugs. Letter from Orville Berwick
(Superintendent of Cecil County Schools, Md.) to J. Joseph Curran (Chairman of Maryland
Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm.) (Feb. 24, 1981) (advocating criminalization of look-alike
drugs in Maryland).
44. The National Institute of Drug Abuse in Rockville, Md., reported thirty-one in-
stances of look-alike overdoses in 1976. The number more than doubled in each succeeding
year. Between January 1977 and June 1980, the agency received reports of 786 overdoses from
caffeine, 112 from phenylpropanolamine (PPA) and 63 from ephedrine sulfate. From an Un-
likely Pa. Mill Town, supra note 4, at A-I; Senator Michael A. O'Pake, Statement to News
Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, (July 8, 1981); see also [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP.
(CCH) 41,421 (Oct. 12, 1981) (poison control centers report a doubling of cases involving
PPA between 1979 and 1980).
Moreover, since 1979, fourteen people have died from look-alike drugs. States that have
reported deaths include California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, and New
York. "Look-Aikes" 4 New Drug Danger, TIME, Sept. 21, 1981, at 69.
45. See supra note 17.
46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
47. Hearings, supra note 8, at 3 (statement of Marion Hambrick, DEA). But see The
Washington Post, Oct. 20, 1981, at A-8, col. I (FDA has had PPA under review for some time.
PPA is allegedly dangerous, even at normal doses, because of the drug's ability to cause large
increase in blood pressure). See also infra note 49.
individually or in unmarked packages,4" increase the risk of an over-
dose by a final purchaser who never sees the precautionary informa-
tion on the labels. 9
Even knowledge of the label's contents will not protect consum-
ers from the dangers of look-alike drugs. Inexperienced users, antic-
ipating the strong effects of illicit drugs, consume multiple doses of
look-alikes in an attempt to achieve the expected result.5 0 Such
quantities vastly increase the risk of fatal side effects. But the risk of
serious drug overdoses from the actual controlled substance is even
greater. The problem, one of "reverse abuse,"'" constitutes the most
severe danger associated with the look-alike drug trade. Reverse
abuse occurs when an individual becomes accustomed to ingesting
large quantities of look-alikes to achieve an amphetamine-like effect.
Should the individual acquire the actual controlled substance in a
later purchase and take the familiar dosage, an overdose on the more
potent drug may result. 2
48. Hearings, supra note 8, at 3 (statement by Michael A. O'Pake, Pa. State Senator); see
supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
49. Caffeine, a powerful central nervous system stimulant, is not generally considered a
drug of misuse despite its stimulant and appetite-suppressant effects. Gastric irritation and
vomiting, which develop before absorption of toxic amounts can occur, usually prevent exces-
sive consumption of caffeine. Nevertheless, indiscriminate use of caffeine can result in over-
dose and death. McGee, Caffeine Poisoning in a 19- Year-Old Female, JOURNAL OF FORENSIC
SCIENCES, Jan. 1980, at 29-32; see also Alstott, Miller & Forney, Report of a Human Fatality
Due to Caffeine (March 3, 1972) (report presented at the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of
the American Academy of Forensic Sciences).
PPA, a nasal decongestant and an appetite suppressant, can prove dangerous even at the
recommended dosage. See supra note 47. Adverse reactions to PPA include headaches, fever,
nausea, vomiting, muscle tenderness, and severe hypertensive reaction. LANCET MED. J., July
7, 1977, at 42-43. PPA's ability to stimulate the brain and to increase blood pressure causes
these reactions. PPA use resulted in the deaths of two men in New Mexico, who suffered
strokes after consuming only two look-alike drugs. Extreme high blood pressure caused the
strokes. Cooper, Flood of Look-Alike' Drugs Appears to Haye Receded in Maryland, The Bal-
timore Sun, Dec. 10, 1981, at B7.
Ephedrine sulphate, similar to caffeine and PPA, causes stimulation of the central nervous
system, increased blood pressure and increased heart rate. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
470 (23d ed. 1976). Side effects include nausea and headache, in addition to the range of
anxiety and tension-related symptoms associated with caffeine and PPA. Parker, Look-Alikes,
the New 'Speed" din publications, May 1981.
Moreover, look-alike barbiturates and prescription sedatives, which contain strong anti-
histamines, can result in a coma if taken in too large a dose. From an Unlikely Pa. Mill Town,
supra note 4, at A-i.
50. [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) 41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982). The
contents of look-alike drugs present additional problems because the pills contain a higher
concentration of chemical ingredients than the ordinary oyer-the-counter drug. The average
diet-aid capsule usually contains about 50mg. of PPA and 100-200mg. of caffeine. Look-alike
capsules can contain as much as 200-500mg. of caffeine combined with 50mg. of PPA. "Look-
Alikes" A New Drug Danger, TIME, Sept. 21, 1981, at 69. An individual's consumption of
even a normal dosage of a drug with highly concentrated ingredients presents an obvious
danger.
51. Bernoski, Drug Disguise, The Times Leader (Wilkes-Barre, PA), Oct. 26, 1981, at 1,
col. 4.
52. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at 2
(statement of Jack B. Ogun, Director, Div. of Drugs, Devices and Cosmetics, Pa. Dep't of
Health); Cooper, Flood of Look-Alike' Drugs Appears to Have Receded in Maryland, The Bal-
timore Sun, Dec. 10, 1981, at B7.
The resemblance of look-alikes to amphetamines also creates
problems for an individual hospitalized because of an overdose. The
confusion over the identity of the drug ingested hampers physicians,
emergency room personnel, and poison control centers in providing
proper medical care and appropriate antidotes. 3
In addition to the physical dangers associated with look-alike
drugs, psychological problems have become evident. There is a
growing climate of acceptance of these drugs among students as sales
increase and their use becomes more widespread. 4 The legal substi-
tutes tempt students who would not take the "real thing."55 The use
of look-alikes thus results in the introduction of individuals into the
drug culture and aids the development of a psychological depen-
dence that can lead to abuse of other drugs.5 6
Until recently, the look-alike problem eluded solution at both
the state and federal levels. The limited scope of state controlled
substances acts restrained state law enforcement officials.5 7 Simi-
larly, the DEA's authority to deal only with controlled substances
rendered it powerless to combat the problem. " The FDA could not
act because manufacturers and distributors properly marked the
drugs.5 9 Nevertheless, under increasing pressure from parents, phy-
sicians, and enforcement officials, both state and federal govern-
ments have instituted steps designed to solve the look-alike drug
problem.
III. State Efforts at Control
A. Statutory Imposition of Criminal Penalties
Since the beginning of 1981, fifteen states have enacted legisla-
tion designed to prohibit the manufacture and distribution of look-
53. Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 97th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 6 (1981) (statement of Joseph P. Hile, Assoc. Comm'r for Regulatory Affairs, FDA);
see [New Matters] FOOD DRUG COSM. L. REP. (CCH) 41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982).
54. Prefatory Note, supra note 28. In a strong statement denouncing look-alike drugs,
Congressman William Hughes stated:
Advertising these drugs as legal and safe completely undermine [sic] drug prevention
programs .... The widespread sale and advertising of look-alikes, coupled with the
claim that they are legal, sabotages the efforts of all of our drug prevention efforts.
Those persons who spread look-alike drugs are attempting to initiate our children
into the drug using cult that we are trying to destroy.
Hearings, supra note 8, at 4-5 (statement of Congressman William J. Hughes, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Crime).
55. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at 3 (testi-
mony of William T. Murphy, Assistant Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigations, United States
Postal Service).
56. Id at 3 (statement of Robert G. Bohn, Dist. Superintendent, Mifflin Co., Pa., School
District).
57. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 20.
alike drugs.6" Twenty-one additional states have proposed legisla-
tion6 and the introduction of similar bills is anticipated in the re-
maining states.62 The currently enacted statutory provisions present
a broad continuum of approaches to the look-alike problem, ranging
from a simplistic, broad answer 63 to a narrowly drawn solution pro-
viding detailed guidelines for determining whether a violation has
occurred.6' The effectiveness of the statutes follows logically along
this continuum.65
60. The following states have enacted legislation designed to ban look-alike drugs: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-2619 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-306 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19-473 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752A (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT.
§ 831.31 (West Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-4.5 (Burns Supp. 1982); 1981 Kan.
Sess. Laws 140; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:97 1.1 (West Supp. 1982); MD. CODE ANN. § 27-
286B (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87 (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-401
(West Supp. 1981-82); OR. REV. STAT. § 475; 859 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780- (Pur-
don's Supp. 19- ); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-42-16 (Supp. 1981); 1981-83 Wis. Legis.
Serv. 90 (West).
Because the state legislatures, with the exception of Delaware, enacted these statutes after
June 1981 no reported cases exist of prosecutions under the laws. Nevertheless, the laws have
had an impact on the look-alike industry. See inf(ra note 65 and accompanying text.
61. The following states had proposed look-alike legislation as of February 1982: Ala-
bama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Washington.
62. Memorandum from Frank D. Arnold (Dep't of Health and Human Servs.) to Look-
Alike Drug Mailing Lists (Jan. 15, 1982) (discussing status of legislative actions regarding
look-alikes) (available on file at the editorial office of the Dickinson Law Review). The DEA
formulated a Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act to serve as a guideline for the states,
see infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
63. The majority of state statutes represent the simple approach. This approach utilizes
weeping provisions and vague terms. Not only do the statutes fail to provide guidelines for
courts to follow in determining whether a violation has occurred, they do not provide an ade-
quate definition of look-alike drugs. Such statutes include the following: ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 82-2619 (Supp. 1981) (unlawful to knowingly or intentionally agree, consent or offer to sell,
furnish, transport, administer, or give any controlled substance and then to substitute a non-
controlled substance); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-306 (Supp. 1982) (unlawful to sell, manufac-
ture, dispense, or distribute, or possess with intent to do the same, a counterfeit controlled
substance); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-473 (Supp. 1982) (unlawful to knowingly deliver or at-
tempt to deliver a noncontrolled substance expressly represented to be a controlled substance
or under circumstances leading one to believe the substance is a controlled substance); FLA.
STAT. § 831.31 (West Supp. 1982) (unlawful to sell, manufacture, deliver, or possess with in-
tent to do the same, a counterfeit controlled substance); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-4.5 (Burns
Supp. 1982) (unlawful to knowingly or intentionally deliver a substance represented to be a
controlled substance); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:971.1 (West Supp. 1982) (unlawful to pro-
duce, manufacture, distribute or dispense a substance falsely represented to be a controlled or
counterfeit controlled substance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-401 (West Supp. 1981-82) (un-
lawful to create, distribute, possess with intent to distibute a counterfeit controlled substance or
to distribute a substance represented to be a controlled dangerous substance); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 475.859 (1981) (unlawful to deliver a noncontrolled substance upon the express or implied
representation that the drug is a controlled substance or that the recipient can distribute the
substance as a controlled substance); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-42-16 (Supp. 1981), see
infra note 66 and accompanying text.
64. Statutes including detailed guidelines for courts to follow include: DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 4752A (Supp. 1982), see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text; 1981 Kan. Sess.
Laws 140, see infra note 78; MD. CODE ANN. § 3A-27-286B (Supp. 1981), see infra note 78;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87 (Supp. 1981), see infra note 78; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780 (Pur-
don's Supp. 19-), see infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text; 1981-83 Wis. Legis. Serv. 90
(West), see infra note 78.
65. Although the statutes have not been in force long enough to determine their long-
South Dakota's legislature enacted perhaps the least effective
statute. The law provides simply that "[n]o person may deliver or
possess with intent to deliver or knowingly manufacture any noncon-
trolled substance which he represents to be a substance controlled
under the provisions of [the Controlled Substances and Marijuana]
chapter. '6 6 Violation of the law is a class two misdemeanor resulting
in thirty days imprisonment, a one hundred dollar fine, or both.67
Since passage of the law, South Dakota's look-alike drug trade has
changed little.68  The minimal penalty imposed on violators is pri-
marily responsible for the law's limited effectiveness.69 Enforcement
range effects, a survey conducted by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services reveals that effectiveness relates directly to comprehensiveness of the various laws.
The following results were noted in states with vague and overly broad statutes. In Arkansas,
no significant actions have been taken. The wording of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2619 (Supp.
1981) limits the law's effectiveness except when a bargain is involved; a more thorough bill is
being considered. In Colorado, authorities made one seizure of look-alikes, but, overall, the
look-alike situation has not changed. In Indiana, no actions have been taken. The Indiana
law is considered ineffective and enforcement officials are searching for other approaches, e.g.,
counterfeiting or false advertising charges. In Oklahoma, the law has had little or no effect
and the board of pharmacy considers the act too weak to be effective. For the results in South
Dakota, see iraa notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
The statutes of Delaware, see infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text, and Maryland, see
infra note 78 and accompanying text, have yielded the most effective results.
The impact of look-alike drug legislation has not been assessed in Connecticut (although
there has been one arrest), Florida, Kansas (publicity from one seizure, however, has served as
a deterrent), Louisiana, and Oregon. The survey did not encompass North Carolina and Wis-
consin. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Impact of State Laws Relating to Look-Alike
Drugs (Nov. 19, 1981) (survey).
66. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-42-16 (Supp. 1981).
67. Id § 22-6-2.
68. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Impact of State Laws Relating to Look-Alike
Drugs (Nov. 19, 1981) (survey).
69. South Dakota provides the highest penalty of any state. Penalties for conviction in
the remaining states vary. In Arkansas, violation is a felony. The punishment depends upon
the schedule of controlled substance that the noncontrolled drug is represented to be. Penalties
vary from a maximum of not less than five nor more than fifty years in prison and a fine not
exceeding $15,000, to a minimum of imprisonment not exceeding five years and a $10,000 fine.
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-901, -1101 (1977). In Colorado, violation is a class four felony punish-
able by a minimum of one day in prison or a $2,000 fine, or a maximum often years, a $30,000
fine, or both. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105 (1973). In Connecticut, violation is a class D
felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding five years, nor less than one year or more
than one-half the maximum sentence imposed. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-35 (1958). In Dela-
ware, the provisions relating to delivery of the controlled substance that the noncontrolled
substance was represented to be govern the punishment. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752A
(Supp. 1981). Florida also conditions the penalty on the representation made. FLA. STAT.
§ 831.31 (West Supp. 1981). Violation in Indiana constitutes a class D felony punishable by
two years imprisonment and a fine not exceeding $10,000. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7
(Bums Supp. 1979). In Kansas, violation is a class A misdemeanor punishable by a term of
imprisonment not exceeding one year; however, if the violator is eighteen years or older and
delivers the substance to a minor, a class E felony is committed resulting in an indeterminate
prison term not less than one year nor more than five. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4501, -4502
(1974). Louisiana provides for imprisonment with or without hard labor not exceeding five
years, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:971.1 (West Supp. 1982). Maryland imposes imprisonment
not exceeding five years, a fine not exceeding $15,000 or both. MD. CODE ANN. § 3A-27-286B
(Supp. 1981). Violation in North Carolina is a felony punishable by imprisonment of not
more than five years, a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95 (1981).
Oklahoma provides that a first violation is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding $1,000. Second conviction results in a felony.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-401 (West Supp. 1981-82). In Oregon, violation is a class A
problems result, however, not only because the penalties are insuffi-
cient to provide a significant deterrent, but also because the minimal
penalties fail to raise adequate revenue to cover enforcement costs. 70
Substantively, the law has several apparent flaws. The require-
ment that an individual represent to a potential customer that the
drug is actually a controlled substance creates problems. The provi-
sion limits prosecution efforts because such express representations
occur infrequently. 7' The statute also forbids delivery of a "sub-
stance," but fails to explain the term or to emphasize the look-alike
nature of the substance. Vagueness in the statutory term increases
existing enforcement difficulties and raises constitutional questions
regarding adequacy of notice and overinclusiveness.72
Originally, Delaware's look-alike statute,73 while more compre-
hensive than South Dakota's, similarly provided for conviction upon
proof of an express representation. Delaware later amended the
original enactment to eliminate this weakness. Under the current
statute,74 a felony results when an individual knowingly delivers or
attempts to deliver a noncontrolled substance upon the express or
implied75 representation that (1) the substance is a controlled sub-
stance or (2) the nature or appearance of the substance will enable
the recipient to distribute the drug as a controlled substance.76
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of one year in prison or a fine not exceeding $1,000.
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.615-635 (1979). Pennsylvania provides for imprisonment not exceeding
five years, a fine not in excess of $10,000 or both. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780 (Purdon's
Supp. 1981). In Wisconsin, violators may be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year or both. 1981-83 Wis. Legis. Serv. 90 (West).
70. Hearings, supra note 8, at 5 (Statement of Michael A. O'Pake, Pa. State Senator); see
also Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Impact of State Laws Relating to Look-Alike Drugs
(Nov. 19, 1981) (survey). South Dakota currently is amending its statute to increase the pen-
alty to a class one misdemeanor. Letter from Dennis R. Pierson (S.D. State Representative)
(Feb. I1, 1982) (discussing South Dakota's look-alike legislation). A class one misdemeanor is
punishable by one year in prison, a $1,000 fine, or both. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-6-2
(1979). This penalty would still be the lightest among the states and doubtless will provide no
greater effectiveness than the original penalty.
71. Statement from Andrew H. Appel, Esquire, to the Pa. Senate Subcomm. on Look-
Alike Drug Legislation (Sept. 2, 1981) (discussing problems associated with statutory wording)
(copy on file in the editorial office of the Dickinson Law Review).
72. See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752A (Supp. 1980). Delaware first adopted state look-
alike legislation. During 1981, there was one successful prosecution under this early law.
Massey, Fake 'Speed' Causes Almost as Much Fear as Mke Real Thing, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1981,
at 8; Letter from Richard J. McMahon (Del. State Prosecutor) to Diane R. Neff (Feb. 3, 1982)
(discussing the effect of Delaware's law). The case, however, is unreported. Letter from Ed-
ward F. Kafader (Del. Deputy Attorney Gen.) (Jan. 27, 1982).
74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752A (Supp. 1982). Since enactment of the laws, two
distributors discontinued activity within the state and police reports indicate a significant re-
duction in availability of look-alike drugs. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Impact of State
Laws Relating to Look-Alike Drugs (Nov. 19, 1981) (survey).
75. The appearance of the product itself implies the representation. Statement from An-
drew H. Appel, Esq., to the Pa. Senate Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drug Legislation (Sept. 2,
1981) (discussing problems associated with statutory wording).
76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752A (Supp. 1982).
Prima facie evidence" of an implied representation exists upon es-
tablishment of two of three factors. First, the noncontrolled sub-
stance must be packaged in a manner normally used for illegal
delivery of controlled substances. Second, the delivery or attempted
delivery must include an exchange of, or a demand for, money or
property substantially in excess of the reasonable value of the non-
controlled substance. Finally, the physical appearance of the prod-
uct must be substantially identical to a specific controlled
substance.78
The specificity of Delaware's legislation enables enforcement
officials to more easily determine whether a violation has occurred
and provides prosecutors and judges with structured guidelines to
aid in proof determinations. While potential problems exist in the
interpretation of the phrases "substantially identical"'79 and "in ex-
cess of the reasonable value," a more restricted definition would
77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1353-54 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines prima facie evidence
as "evidence good and sufficient on its face; such as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense,
and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."
78. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752A (Supp. 1982). Maryland's statute, MD. CODE ANN.
§ 3A-27-286B (Supp. 1981), which is substantially similar to the Delaware act, provides that no
one may distribute, attempt to distribute, or possess with intent to distribute a noncontrolled
substance: (I) represented to be a controlled substance; (2) intended for use or distribution as
a controlled substance; or (3) under circumstances leading one reasonably to know that the
noncontrolled substance will be used or distributed for use as a controlled dangerous sub-
stance. The statute also contains provisions identical to that of Delaware's prima facie evi-
dence factors. In Maryland, however, the factors are not prima facie evidence but exist only
for consideration by the court in determining guilt. Mere proof that the conduct occurred is
not sufficient to prove a violation. Although Maryland's failure to broaden the law's scope by
including implied representations represents a weakness in the statute, the law has achieved
more success than that of any other state. After one seizure in Baltimore, fifteen distributors
ended operations within the state and police reports indicated a substantial reduction in avail-
ability of look-alike drugs. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Impact of State Laws relating
to Look-Alike Drugs (Nov. 19, 1981) (survey); see also Cooper, Flood of 'Look-Alike' Drugs
Appears to Have Receded in Maryland, The Baltimore Sun, Dec. 10, 1981, at B7.
Both statutes further provide that the belief that the noncontrolled substance was actually
a controlled substance provides no defense. Similar provisions are included in COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-5-306 (Supp. 1982) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780 (Purdon's Supp. 19-).
Three state statutes contain provisions substantially similar to Delaware's prima facie evi-
dence factors: 1981 KAN. SESS. LAWS 140 (establishing any one of the three factors allows a
presumption that the substance is a controlled substance or can be distributed as such); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-87 (Supp. 1981) (establishing all three factors provides evidence that the sub-
stance was intentionally misrepresented as a controlled substance); 1981-83 Wis. LEGIS. SERV.
90 (West) (sets forth elements for prima facie evidence that differ from those of Delaware).
Under Wisconsin law, proof of any of the following establishes prima facie evidence of a
violation: (1) the physical appearance of the product is substantially the same as that of a
controlled substance; (2) the substance is unpackaged or packaged in a manner normally used
for illegal delivery of a controlled substance; (3) the substance is not labeled according to FDA
standards; and (4) the person delivering the substance states to the recipient that the drug may
be resold for a substantial profit.
79. Many have criticized the use of the term "substantially identical" on the grounds that
a product is either identical or not identical. The similarity between a noncontrolled and con-
trolled substance would be phrased more accurately as "substantially resembles" or "virtually
identical." Statement from Andrew H. Appel, Esq., to the Pa. Senate Subcomm. on Look-
Alike Drug Legislation (Sept. 2, 1981) (discussing problems associated with statutory
wording).
render the statute ineffective. Because of the variable circumstances
for marketing look-alikes, narrower statutory definitions of price and
appearance terms would substantially hinder enforcement agencies
and would enable those involved in the industry to easily escape
prosecution.8°
Nonetheless, Delaware's law omits important provisions. Un-
like South Dakota's statute, the Delaware law does not prohibit the
manufacture of look-alike substances. While the statutory language
may imply that manufacturers will distribute the product, thereby
violating the law, specific prohibition of manufacture would aid in
the prosecution of violators. Similarly, the statute fails to prohibit
the use of look-alikes,8" enabling the ultimate consumer, who be-
lieves he has purchased and used an actual controlled substance, to
escape prosecution. A provision holding an individual criminally re-
sponsible for use of a noncontrolled substance upon the belief that
the drug is a controlled substance would eliminate the final link in
the distribution chain.
Despite the omissions, Delaware's law has succeeded in reduc-
ing the availability of look-alike drugs in the state. In 1981, Dela-
ware became the first state to obtain a conviction under the new
statutes.82 As a result of the conviction and subsequent publicity
surrounding the law, manufacturers and distributors purportedly are
reluctant to deliver drugs into the state.83
Pennsylvania, building upon Delaware's law, recently enacted
the most comprehensive look-alike statute to date.84 The new law
80. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
81. Kansas promulgated the strictest look-alike law and the only statute to prohibit the
use of look-alike drugs. 1981 Kan. Sess. Laws 140. The law also prohibits advertising to
promote the sale of a "simulated controlled substance." Id Wisconsin enacted the only other
statute to attack the advertising aspect of the look-alike industry. 1981-83 Wis. Legis. Serv. 90
(West).
82. See supra note 73.
83. Letter from Richard J. McMahon (Delaware State Prosecutor) (Feb. 3, 1982) (dis-
cussing effect of Delaware's law) (copy on file in the editorial office of the Dickinson Law
Review); see also supra note 74.
84. Pennsylvania's law, the most recent, was signed into legislation on February 16, 1982.
The law took effect in April 1982. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780- (Purdon's Supp. 19-).
Prior to passage of the law, the Pennsylvania Department of Health enacted regulations to
cope with the look-alike problem. The regulations added a new definition to the misbranding
regulations of 28 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 25.101 (Shepard's 1982) and more stringent require-
ments for registration under 28 PA. ADMIN, CODE § 25.113 (Shepard's 1982). Specifically, 28
PA. ADMIN. CODE § 25.101 provides:
(b) Any drug in a solid dosage form other than a nonproprietary drug that contains
any quantity of caffeine, phenylpropanolamine, or pseudoephedrine or. . . ingredi-
ents which have a stimulant or depressant effect on humans will be deemed mis-
branded. . . regardless of its label, labeling, or packaging if its size, shape, and color
or its imprinted symbols, numbers, or letters are substantially identical in appearance
to a controlled substance
(c) Any solid dosage form which contains markings which bear a distinctive trade-
attempts to correct several of the flaws noted in prior legislation.
Under this enactment, an individual manufacturer who processes,
packages, distributes or sells a noncontrolled substance having a
stimulant or depressant effect85 and substantially resembling86 a con-
trolled substance commits a felony. A violation also occurs when an
individual knowingly distributes or sells a noncontrolled substance
upon the express or implied representation that the drug is a con-
trolled substance or that the recipient can sell or distribute the drug
as a controlled substance.8 7 Although Pennsylvania's law encom-
passes all persons involved in the production and distribution of
look-alikes, the statute, like Delaware's, fails to provide a penalty
against the ultimate consumer, allowing an individual who intends
to use an illegal substance to avoid arrest.
Each of Pennsylvania's statutory provisions delineating unlaw-
ful conduct contains a list of factors for courts to consider in deter-
mining whether a violation has occurred. Factors include the
appearance and packaging of the substance, and the amount of con-
sideration tendered for the substance.88 Specifically, in considering
appearance, the court must determine whether the substance is "sub-
stantially similar in size, shape, color and markings or lack thereof to
a specific controlled substance."8 9 This description attempts to rem-
edy the failure of other laws to emphasize the look-alike nature of
the substance involved in a transaction. The effort largely fails be-
cause the vagueness of the phrase substantially identical provides no
standards for determining when a substance falls within the defini-
tion; however, the variety of look-alike drugs necessitates judicial
flexibility in defining the nature of a look-alike substance to attain
effective enforcement.
mark, trade name, brand name, or manufacturer's name so as not to appear substan-
tially identical to a controlled substance will not be in violation...
28 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 25.113 provides, in pertinent part:
(e) Registration as a distributor is required by every person . . . who sells or other-
wise distributes any of the following:
' (4) Any drug having a stimulant or depressant effect which is sold or
otherwise distributed to one person or address in quantities of a 1000 or more doses
within a given 30-day period.
The regulations, more thorough than any state law in their description of look-alike drugs,
emphasize the nature of the substance and not the particular representations made. The stan-
dards provide a measure of judicial flexibility while setting forth more distinct standards to
determine whether a violation has occurred. See 11 PA. ADMIN. BULL. 42, at 3561 (Oct. 17,
1981).
85. The statute exempts prescription drugs. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780- (Purdon's
Supp. 19-).
86. The phrase "substantially resembles" in the Pennsylvania statute removes the gram-
matical inaccuracy and consequent ambiguity of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752A (Supp.
1982).
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780- (Purdon's Supp. 19-).
88. Id
89. Id
Pennsylvania's statute provides exceptions to protect legitimate
users of noncontrolled substances. The law does not apply to en-
forcement officials acting in the scope of their employment; to per-
sons who manufacture, process, package, distribute and sell
noncontrolled substances to licensed medical practitioners; or to li-
censed medical practitioners, pharmacists and others authorized to
use controlled substances. Additionally, the law contains a "travel-
ing grandfather clause."9 ° This provision exempts a noncontrolled
substance from the law's penalties if, at a later date, a controlled
substance, which the original drug allegedly imitates, appears on the
market. In such a case, the unintended similarity9 should result in
no criminal liability.
Because the Pennsylvania law did not take effect until April
1982, the. statute's effectiveness remains untested. Recent experience
has shown, however, that the most effective laws are also the most
comprehensive ones.92 Presumably, then, the comprehensive nature
of Pennsylvania's law will prove equally effective in halting the look-
alike industry.
Despite the variable success of recent state statutes, legislators
only cautiously express an optimistic attitude toward long-run statu-
tory effects. Because of the difficulty in arriving at a clear-cut defini-
tion of the term "substantially identical," look-alike firms can easily
avoid the reach of the laws. They need only alter the size, shape or
color of their product to continue selling the same drugs they pres-
ently market.93 In so doing, the firms will remain outside the statu-
tory proscriptions, for eventually the alterations will fall just below
the judicially drawn line of "substantially identical." The look-alike
industry, however, depends upon the companies' ability to maintain
a "mystique"94 capable of deceiving the public. While the legislative
efforts may not eliminate the manufacture and distribution of look-
alikes, they at least will strip away the facade and take the high profit
out of the look-alike business.95 Even though individuals may con-
tinue to purchase these pills, they will not pay black market prices
for substances recognizable as over-the-counter drugs.
90. Bachman, Look-Alike Drugs: What's Being Done, Centre Daily Times (State Col-
lege, Pa.), Nov. 13, 1981, at 1.
91. Id
92. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
93. The Patriot (Harrisburg, Pa.), Sept. 24, 1981, at 52; see Hearings Before the Special
Subcom on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at 2 (testimony of James A. Stuart, Executive
Director, On Drugs, Inc.); Letter from James A. Stuart (Executive Director, On Drugs, Inc.) to
Pa. Senator J. Doyle Corman (Sept. 4, 1981) (discussing the proposed Pennsylvania law)
("Distributors will not be put out of business by the bill. They will adapt to it.").
94. Memorandum from Pa. Senator Michael A. O'Pake to All Members--Senate Sub-
comm. on Look-Alike Drugs (Sept. 2, 1981) (discussing the look-alike problem and the pro-
posed Pennsylvania bill).
95. Id
B. Constitutional Challenges to Look-Alike Legislation
As the number of states adopting look-alike legislation in-
creases, manufacturers and distributors, in an effort to protect their
businesses, will expectedly attack the validity of the statutes. One
such attack would challenge the constitutionality of the statutes on
grounds of vagueness and equal protection.
I. The Void/or Vagueness Doctrine. -A law is void for vague-
ness when the statutory language "fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
statute."96 A fundamental corollary to fair notice is the requirement
that explicit legislative standards limit the discretion of law enforce-
ment officials, thus avoiding the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. 97 Under these standards, an absence of
definitional clarity will lead a court to invalidate an enactment for
vagueness.98 Nevertheless, a strong presumption of validity attaches
to congressional acts and has led the Supreme Court to hold that
courts will not automatically invalidate statutes as vague simply be-
cause of difficulty in determining whether marginal conduct falls
within the statutory language. 99
The constitutionality of a vague statutory standard closely re-
lates to the question whether the statute incorporates a requirement
of mens rea.' ° This scienter requirement mitigates the objection
that an enactment punishes, without warning, an offense of which
96. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-28, at 718 (1978). This section of the com-
ment discusses the void for vagueness doctrine as that doctrine relates to procedural due pro-
cess uncertainty, i.e., a concern with statutory language so obscure that it gives no adequate
warning of violation. Substantive due process uncertainty concerns language so broad and
sweeping that it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. Collings, Jr., Unconstitutional
Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955); see also Note, Policing the Head
Shops: Are Bongs, Roach Clips, Syringes, And. . .Prohibited Drug Paraphernalia, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 183 (1981). See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109
(1972) (when a vague statute abuts first amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise
of those freedoms). Because no constitutionally protected right to manufacture or distribute
drugs exists, substantive due process uncertainty does not apply. But see infra note 148 on the
constitutionality of regulating commercial speech.
97. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also Papachristou v. City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (ordinance falls for vagueness if it encourages arbi-
trary and erratic arrests and convictions).
98. Note, Policing the Head Shops." Are Bongs, Roach Clips, Syringes, And. . .Prohibited
Drug Paraphernalia? supra note 96, at 185-86; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972) (an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions lack clear definition); cf.
A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925) (the rule or standard
of legal compliance cannot be so vague that there is no discernible standard at all).
99. United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963). The Supreme Court
has consistently sought an interpretation that supports the constitutionality of legislation. Id;
see also Minnesota v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (Supreme Court upheld the state's
construction of a statute); cf United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (Constitution does
not require impossible standards of a legislature; the legislature will not be prohibited from
declaring an offense if clearer and more precise language was not possible).
100. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979). Colautti noted that the lack of a scien-
the accused is unaware.' 0 ' In the absence of scienter, a vague statute
essentially serves as a trap for persons acting in good faith. °2
Although current state statutes leave several terms undefined,
most of the laws incorporate a scienter requirement'03 to alleviate
vagueness in their statutory language. Those statutes lacking a mens
rea requirement"° will face a tougher challenge, but the laws proba-
ter requirement exacerbates the uncertainty of a statute. Id at 401; see Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972).
101. Note, Policing the Head Shops.- Are Bongs, Roach Clips, Syringes, And. . .Prohibited
Drug Paraphernalia, supra note 96, at 187. No constitutional detriment accrues to a person
accused of violating the law when he acts with knowledge that specific consequences are sub-
stantially certain to follow from his conduct. Id. at 188. Thus, concerning look-alike drugs,
criminal liability should attach when the manufacturer or distributor legitimately creates or
sells products under circumstances that would reasonably cause him to believe that they would
ultimately be used illicitly. Cf. infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (discussing Postal
Service argument that distributors reasonably should know the ultimate use of their product).
Most recently, courts have utilized the void for vagueness doctrine to invalidate several
statutes designed to curtail commercial distribution of drug paraphernalia. Drug parapherna-
lia denotes a variety of accessories or devices that facilitate the use of controlled substances.
The difficulty in arriving at a concise definition of the terms "paraphernalia" and "drug-re-
lated devices" has induced several courts to nullify drug paraphernalia statutes on the basis
that the terms are unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488
F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (statutory language that made unlawful the sale or supplying
of hypodermic syringe, marijuana pipes, or other instrumentsprimariy adapted for the admin-
istration or use of controlled substances presented a complete dearth of objective standards);
Knedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F. Supp. 990 (D.N.J. 1980) (declaring unconstitutionally
vague the subjective standard and the enumeration of items covered in an ordinance that pro-
hibited the sale, inter alia, of any syringe, needle, eye dropper, spoon, or other paraphernalia if
the seller had reason to believe the product would be used with a controlled substance).
Because many of the devices described as drug paraphernalia, such as syringe eye drop-
pers, incense burners and pipes, have legitimate uses, a stricter standard was needed to uphold
the statutes and ordinances. The scienter requirement provided that standard. In Delaware
Access Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289 (D. Del. 1980), the court upheld a drug
paraphernalia statute that made it unlawful to deliver or manufacture "drug paraphernalia,
knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know," that the item would be
used to violate drug laws. The statutory definition of drug paraphernalia went unchallenged;
rather, the imposition of a constructive knowledge standard supplied the basis for the statutory
attack. In upholding the standard and, subsequently, the statute, the court noted that the act
required the state to prove not only that a defendant intended the item for an illicit use, but
also that he knew or acted under circumstances in which he reasonably should have known
that the item would be so used. This dual requirement would protect legitimate merchants
who made no judgment about the purposes for which persons purchased their goods. While
the court acknowledged the standard's imperfection, it noted that most criminal statutes re-
quire an intent to commit a crime as one element of the offense and that a determination of
such intent often requires examination of all the surrounding circumstances. The court failed
to perceive how the constructive knowledge provision of the act in question posed a greater
risk of uneven law enforcement than most other criminal statutes and, consequently, refused to
invalidate the statute. See Franza v. Carey, 518 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding
"designed for the purpose" language of drug paraphernalia statute as indicating a requirement
of intent and declaring that an otherwise vague statute may be saved by the inclusion of a
scienter or mens rea requirement).
102. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979).
103. The following states specifically require knowledge or intent for violations to occur:
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2619 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-473 (Supp. 1982); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752A (Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-4.5 (Burns Supp. 1982);
1981 Kan. Sess. Laws 140; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87 6(b) (Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35.
§ 780- (Purdon's Supp. 19-); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-42-16 (Supp. 1982); 1981-83
Wis. Legis. Serv. 90 (West); see supra notes 63-64.
104. The following states do not specifically require intent or knowledge for violations to
occur: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-306 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. § 831.31 (West Supp. 1982); LA.
bly will be upheld for two reasons. First, courts will only reluctantly
invalidate the laws because of the strong presumption of validity at-
taching to legislative acts. Second, as a practical matter, legislatures
cannot draft more precise language. The very nature of look-alike
drugs creates definitional problems of clarity because of the variety
of shapes, sizes, colors, and markings. A stricter definition would
hinder enforcement and enable firms to circumvent the law by mak-
ing minor conforming changes in their products. When such circum-
stances effectively prevent a legislature from drafting precisely,
courts will not conclude automatically that the statute falls for
vagueness because "the Constitution does not require impossible
standards." I05
2. Equal Protection of the Laws. -The fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that "[njo state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.""°6 The equal protection clause does not deny states the power
to classify in adopting laws, but rather allows a wide scope of legisla-
tive discretion.0 7 A law will be invalidated only when the chal-
lenged classification lacks any reasonable basis and is purely
arbitrary. 08 In determining whether a classification is rationally re-
lated °9 to achievement of a legitimate state purpose, courts must an-
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:971.1 (West Supp. 1982); MD. CODE ANN. § 3A-27-286B (Supp. 1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-401 (West Supp. 1981-82); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.859 (1981); see
supra notes 63-64.
105. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947). For a thorough discussion of the void
for vagueness doctrine, see Note, The Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
107. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
108. fd; see also Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). As
in the case of constitutional challenges to statutes on vagueness grounds, a presumption arises
in favor of legislative correctness in the face of equal protection challenges. Because courts
presume the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment, regulatory legislation affect-
ing ordinary commercial transaction is not declared unconstitutional unless, in light of facts
made known or generally assumed, the character of the law precludes the presumption of a
rational basis on which the law rests. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 (1938). When a classification is called into question, if any reasonably conceivable state of
facts can sustain the law, that state of facts will be assumed to have existed at the time of the
law's enactment. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). The burden,
moreover, rests upon the party challenging the classification to demonstrate that the classifica-
tion is arbitrary and does not rest upon any reasonable grounds. Id at 79.
109. The rational relation test applies to the examination of regulatory legislation that
affects commercial transactions. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938). Classifications relating to the exercise of a fundamental right, id at 152 n.4, or based
upon a suspect class, i.e., a classification based upon race, national origin, alienage or, increas-
ingly, gender, receive a stricter scrutiny. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 16-6 to -28, at 1000-77 (1978). Because look-alike drug manufacturers and distributors
do not fall within the general class of suspect groups and because the classification is not
related to a fundamental right, but rather is commercially oriented, the classification need only
meet the rational relation test. In addition, the class has "none of the traditional indicia of
suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
swer two questions: "(1) Does the challenged legislation have a
legitimate purpose?, and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to
believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that
purpose?""'  The statute will be upheld if both questions are an-
swered affirmatively.
Litigants challenge classifications as either underinclusive or
overinclusive. Underinclusive classifications fail to include all those
similarly situated with respect to a rule and, therefore, burden fewer
persons than logically necessary to achieve the intended governmen-
tal end."' Courts tolerate underinclusiveness because of judicial
recognition of the difficulties inherent in the legislative process." 1
2
Similarly, legislative difficulties create judicial tolerance of
overinclusive classifications, which impose a burden upon a wider
range of individuals than those included in the class "tainted with
the mischief" 3  at which the law aims." 4  Overinclusiveness
presents a stronger argument for challenge than underinclusiveness.
Underinclusive statutes at least include those tainted by the mischief
while overinclusive classifications reach out to the innocent by-
stander as well." 5 Despite a greater tendency to invalidate overin-
clusive legislation, courts will not require perfect congruence
between governmental aims and statutory classifications. The equal
protection clause does not require a state to choose between attack-
ing every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. "
6
In applying these standards, state look-alike statutes forbid the
manufacture, distribution, delivery, or sale of look-alike substances.
The laws apply to everyone involved in the distribution chain except
the ultimate consumer.' "I The application of the laws only to those
tainted with the mischief of dealing in look-alike drugs obviates any
challenge of overinclusiveness. Conversely, the failure of look-alike
drug statutes to declare the conduct of users unlawful may provide
an argument of underinclusiveness. Although the inclusion of this
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodrigues, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
110. W & S Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 S. Ct. 2070, 2083 (1981).
11I. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-4, at 997 (1978).
112. Id, see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) ("the law does all that is needed
when it does all that it can"); Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227 (1914) ("a statute
aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be
most felt, is not to be upset"); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) ("some
play must be allowed for the joints of the machine").
113. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 351
(1949).
114. Id" see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-4, at 999 (1978).
115. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 113, at 351.
116. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970); accord Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) ("It is no requirement of equal protection that all
evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.").
117. But see supra note 81 (Kansas law prohibits use of look-alikes).
class would appear logical to achieve the governmental end of elimi-
nating the look-alike problem, the omission will probably not cause
invalidation of the statutes. Look-alike laws have a legitimate pur-
pose-protection of the public's health, welfare, and safety-and
legislators reasonably could believe that regulating manufacturers
and distributors of dangerous drugs would promote this purpose.
Because the classifications meet the rational relation test, the state
statutes should withstand any constitutional attack based on the
equal protection clause."r
8
C Civil Statutory Penalties
Illinois has achieved more success than any other state in deal-
ing with the look-alike drug problem." 9 Forty-one manufacturers
and distributors of look-alikes 20 defended lawsuits instituted pursu-
ant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act,' 2 ' the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,' 22 and
the state's public nuisance law.' 23 These suits have sought both in-
junctions to prevent firms from conducting business in Illinois and
118. For a thorough analysis of the equal protection clause, see Tussman & tenBroek,
supra note 113.
119. Presently, Illinois has no law aimed at eliminating the look-alike problem; however,
the state is among those that have proposed legislation. See supra note 6 1.
120. The Illinois actions have taken place over a period of nine months. Treveletti, Bill
Would Aid Phony Drug Ban, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 20, 1982, § 1, at 12. The first action oc-
curred in May 1981; in July 1981 a second suit was instituted. The first suit resulted in a
preliminary injunction against the firm; the second suit resulted in a temporary restraining
order. Ty Fahner (Illinois Attorney General), Press Release (July 1, 1981). A virtual cam-
paign against look-alike drugs then began. Late in July, consumer protection lawsuits were
filed against twenty-six distributors, Ty Fahner (Illinois Attorney General), Press Release (July
23, 1981); eleven suits were filed in September 1981, id (Sept. 28, 1981); and two additional
suits were filed in November 1981, bringing the total to forty-one suits. Id (Nov. 17, 1981).
The occurrence in Illinois of seven of the fourteen nationwide deaths caused by look-alike
drugs provides one explanation for the vigorous action taken in that state. Id
121. The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act of Illinois provides in
pertinent part:
[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use. . . of any
deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment,
suppression or omission. . . or the use. . . of any practice described in Section 2 of
the "Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act" . . . in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether any person has in fact been misled,
deceived or damaged thereby ...
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
122. The relevant portions of Illinois' Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act provide:
312. Acts Constituting Deceptive Trade Practice
§ 2. A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his busi-
ness he:
(5) represents that the goods have. . . characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or
quantities that they do not have ...
(12) engages in any. . . conduct which. . . creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding [as to the source or certification of the goods).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 312.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82).
123. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 100 1/2, § 1-29 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
maximum civil penalties of $50,000.124 Although twenty firms sub-
sequently ceased operations within the state, 125 the lawsuits have not
completely eliminated the problem. Several distributors who volun-
tarily agreed to end their operations either began business again
under new company names or sold their stock to other companies.
26
In effect, the civil penalty acts as only a stopgap measure until the
state enacts a criminal law.'27 Nonetheless, actions taken pursuant
to the civil statutes are the most successful nationwide and Illinois
officials hope that publicity from the suits will exert a chilling effect
on other look-alike manufacturers and distributors.'28
In addition, California took action under the Business and Pro-
fessions Code'2 9 and the Health and Safety Code 30 to prohibit four
companies from selling or advertising look-alike drugs in that
state.' 3 ' The complaints alleged that the companies manufactured,
delivered and offered for sale counterfeit, adulterated and mis-
branded drugs, and placed upon the drugs or their packages the like-
ness of a trade name or other identifying mark of another
individual. 132 While these cases currently are undecided, the Cali-
fornia approach illustrates the same weakness as the Illinois ap-
proach. Although civil enforcement provides effective short-term
relief, the penalties may not provide sufficient deterrent effect in a
business yielding such large profits. Moreover, both the California
124. Ty Fahner (Illinois Attorney General), Press Release (Nov. 17, 1981).
125. Treveletti, Bill WouldAid Phony Drug Ban, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 20, 1982, § 1, at 12;
Ty Fahner (Illinois Attorney General), Press Release (Jan. 19, 1982). Fifteen firms voluntarily
agreed to end their operations. McCahill, Fahner Sues 11 More Firms in 'Look-Alike' Drug
Fraud, Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 29, 1981, § 1, at 12.
126. McCahill, Fahner Sues 11 More Firms in "Look-Alike" Drug Fraud, Chicago Sun-
Times, Sept. 29, 1981, at § I, at 12.
127. Id
128. Ty Fahner (Illinois Attorney General), Press Release (May 28, 1981).
129. The relevant provisions of the Business and Professions Code of California, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200-208 (Deering Supp. 1981) and § 17500-572 (Deering 1976), state:
§ 17200. Definition
As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair
or fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertis-
ing and any act prohibited by [the provisions of Section 17500].
§ 17500. False or Misleading Statements Generally
It is unlawful for any person . . . to make or disseminate or cause to be made or
disseminated before the public. . . in any newspaper or other publication, or any
advertising device. . . any statement. . . which is untrue or misleading, and which
is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue
or misleading....
Id §§ 17200, -500.
130. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 26000-837 (Deering 1975).
131. Sacramento Bee, Nov. 29, 1981, at B4, col. 1. The one California arrest charged the
defendant with stocking for sale imitation stimulants and depressants, thereby selling mis-
branded drugs. Dawson, Arrest Madefor Look-Alike Drugs, valley Daily News (Van Nuys,
Cal.), Oct. 30, 1981, at I, col. 5.
132. Complaint for Injunction, Civil Penalties, Restitutions and Other Relief at 7-8,
Deukmejian v. Hall, No. 300088 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. filed Nov. 27, 1981). The com-
plaint further alleges that the defendant engaged in deceptive and misleading advertising and
in acts of unfair competition. Id at 4-7.
and Illinois laws emphasize the initial manufacturing and distribut-
ing stages of the business. No provisions address the street abuse
aspects of the problem. Recognizing the failure of civil penalties to
provide an adequate disincentive, both states have joined the ranks
of those proposing legislation to impose criminal sanctions on manu-
facturers, distributors, and dealers.' 33
IV. Federal Efforts at Control
A. Enforcement Through the Mails
Because most purchases and distributions of look-alike drugs
occur through the mail, one federal agency able to attack the indus-
try is the United States Postal Service. As of November 1981, the
Postal Service had filed civil administrative complaints against
thirty-nine distributors 34 alleging violations of section 3005 of the
Postal Reorganization Act.1 35  This section prohibits individuals
from conducting a scheme to obtain money or property through the
mail by means of false representations. 136 Upon finding the employ-
ment of such a scheme, the Postal Service has authority to withhold
and return to the sender any mail addressed to an individual who
solicits money or property by means of false representations.
37
Accordingly, the Postal Service filed the suits alleging the exist-
ence of a scheme in that: (I) the firms, through advertising and pro-
motional materials, 38 sell various drug products; (2) the drugs are
133. See supra note 61.
134. Hearings Before Special Subcomrn on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at 5 (testi-
mony of William T. Murphy, Assistant Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigations, United States
Postal Service). Temporary restraining orders issued against four distributors. [New Matters]
FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) 41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982). Nine other distributors signed
consent agreements to avoid suit. Trafficking in Look-Alikes, supra note 17.
135. 39 U.S.C. § 101-5605 (1980).
136. Id § 3005.
137. Id The section also forbids payment by a postmaster to the person, or his represen-
tative, of any money order or postal note drawn to his order and provides that the postmaster
return the sum to the remitter.
This provision (and 39 U.S.C. § 3007, see infra note 147 and accompanying text) functions
to protect the public against use of the mails for distributing false representations as a basis for
obtaining money or property. The policy of these sections does not include imposing punish-
ment on violators. Criminal penalties are provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1970) and can be
imposed only in a judicial proceeding in which the accused has the benefit of constitutional
and statutory safeguards appropriate to a criminal trial. Com. v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474
(1943); see also Greene v. Kern, 174 F. Supp. 480, 483 (D.N.J.), afl'd, 269 F.2d 344 (3d Cir.
1959); H.R. REP. No. 235, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4290, 4294. The Postal Service doubtless filed suit under the civil postal fraud statute, as
opposed to the criminal statute, because of the need for expedited procedures. See infra notes
148-49 and accompanying text.
138. In re Complaint Against Brant Pharmacal at 2, United States v. Brant Pharmacal,
No. 11/139 (D.C., filed July 1, 1981). The Postal Service characterizes the advertisements as
deceptive and misleading. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application
for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, United States v.
Clifton, Inc., No. 81-1134 at 1-14, (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 30, 1981). Moreover, the firm's adver-
tisements imply that the products pose no particular health hazard, Id at 3, while the Postal
designed to resemble, and are easily mistaken for, controlled sub-
stances; (3) persons commonly purchase the controlled substances
for purposes of drug abuse; (4) the firms knowingly cooperate with
their customers by furnishing counterfeit drugs that enable and en-
courage resale of the drugs under the false representation that they
actually are the imitated product; (5) the firms know, or have reason
to know, that their customers use the drugs in this manner; and
(6) the firms reap profits by mail because of the misrepresentations
they enable and encourage their customers to make.
139
The failure of distributors to communicate directly with the per-
son defrauded poses one difficulty for the Postal Service in establish-
ing the existence of a scheme. Often, the distributor sells to a dealer
who is aware that the product is a look-alike drug. The dealer then
makes the false representation to the final consumer. The Postal
Service asserts that whether the original seller or an intermediate
buyer makes the false representation is irrelevant in determining
whether the distributors have conducted a scheme involving false
representations. 4
In support of this proposition, the Postal Service relies heavily
on United States v. International Term Papers, 4 ' in which the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit stated: "That the [customer] first
pays for that which will enable him to make a subsequent false rep-
resentation to his [own customer] does not affect the means-end rela-
tionship."' 42 In International Term Papers, the defendant companies
sold academic papers to students for submission to universities as the
students' own work. The court held that section 3005 applied even
absent allegations that the distributors used the mails to communi-
cate with the persons ultimately defrauded.' 43 The court noted that
section 3005 specifies neither the timing, the source, nor the target of
the false representations."' Rather, in a three-party situation, the
sender's contemplation of a scheme that involves a misrepresentation
Service has taken the position that look-alike drugs constitute a serious potential health haz-
ard. [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP., (CCH) 41,472 (Oct. 26, 1981).
139. In re Complaint Against Brant Pharmacal at 2-3, United States v Brant Pharmacal,
No. 11/139 (D.C. filed July 1, 1981).
140. See generally Hearings Before Special Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28,
at 3-5 (testimony of William T. Murphy, Assistant Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigations,
United States Postal Service); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Applica-
tion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1-14, United
States v. Clifton, Inc., No. 81-1134 (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 30, 1981).
141. 477 F.2d 1277 (Ist Cir. 1973).
142. Id. at 1279.
143. Id at 1278-79.
144. Id at 1279. The court based its decision on a recognition that the technology of
merchandising false representations does not confine itself to selling directly to the consumer.
The court found no basis for a policy that would allow an injunction against one who mails
false advertising to a prospective buyer while forbidding an injunction against one who mails
false advertising and fraudulent selling advice to sales representatives for use in calling on
prospective buyers. Id," see also Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d
based upon the material sent constitutes the critical requirement.'45
Under the look-alike drug approach, the materials sent are pills that
imitate controlled substances. Because their outward appearance en-
ables dealers to misrepresent the drugs to a purchaser as a controlled
substance, distributors, who know or reasonably should know of the
product's ultimate use, allegedly conduct a scheme to obtain money
through the mails by means of false representations. 
46
In conjunction with the institution of section 3005 proceedings,
the Postal Service sought injunctions pursuant to section 3007 of the
Postal Reorganization Act' 47 to detain the firms' incoming mail dur-
ing pendency of the administrative proceedings. 48 Section 3007, a
Cir. 1981) (enjoining practice of placing means of deception into the hands of persons likely to
use such means).
145. United States v. International Term Papers, 477 F.2d at 1280. See generally Ives
Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981) (pattern of illegal substitu-
tion and mislabeling is necessary and a manufacturer or wholesaler is liable if he suggests,
even by implication, that a retailer fill a bottle with generic capsules and apply Ives' mark to
the label).
146. See generaly Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1-14, United States v.
Clifton, Inc., No. 81-1134 (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 30, 1981).
147. 39 U.S.C. § 3007 (1980), a companion section to 39 U.S.C. § 3005 for the protection
of consumers from mail order fraud, provides in pertinent part:
(a) In preparation for or during the pendency of proceedings under J§ 3005], the
United States district court in the district in which the defendant receives his mail
shall, upon application therefor by the Postal Service and upon a showing of prob-
able cause to believe [the] section is being violated, enter a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction pursuant to rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure directing the detention of the defendant's incoming mail by the postmaster
pending the conclusion of the statutory proceedings. . . . The district court may pro-
vide in the order that the detained mail be open to examination by the defendant and
such mail be delivered as is clearly not connected with the alleged unlawful activity.
An action taken by the court hereunder does not affect or determine any fact at issue
in the statutory proceedings.
39 U.S.C. § 3007.
148. Both § 3005 and § 3007 have withstood constitutional attacks alleging infringement
of the first amendment right to freedom of speech. The Supreme Court has held that the first
amendment protects commercial speech. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The presence of untruthful, deceptive or mis-
leading commercial speech, however, qualifies the protection. Thus, in holding that such
speech is protected, the Court did not rule that commercial speech totally escapes regulation.
Id at 770-71. The first amendment right to freedom of speech does not extend so far as to
grant an individual the privilege to mislead the public by means of false commercial advertis-
ing. To assume that first amendment safeguards apply equally, whether the area involved is
politics, religion, obscenity, or commercial fraud, is error. Lynch v. Blount, 330 F. Supp. 689
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aft'd, 404 U.S. 1007 (1972). Following this rationale, government measures
may appropriately insure accuracy in the context of commercial speech although they would
be repugnant elsewhere. Commercial speech receives only a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position, in the scale of first amendment values. Commer-
cial speech experiences forms of regulation that would be impermissible in the realm of non-
commercial expression. United States v. Athena Prods. Ltd., 654 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1981);
see also Hollywood House Int'l, Inc. v. Klassen, 508 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Beamish, 466 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1972); ViAids Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 464 F. Supp.
976 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Original Cosmetics Prods., Inc. v. Strachan, 459 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
Although § 3007 does not unduly abridge first amendment freedoms relating to use of the
mails, a defendant's constitutional rights receive protection by requiring the Postal Service to
clearly meet the burden of demonstrating probable cause of a § 3005 violation. United States
necessary interim measure, protects consumers from deceptive mail
order promotions pending final determination of a Postal Service de-
cision.t49 Unlike typical injunction proceedings, 50 the requirement
of irreparable harm to consumers does not condition the requested
relief.1 51 The Postal Service instead must show probable cause to
believe that firms are violating section 3005.152
Under court interpretation of section 3005, a scheme amounts to
a false representation when the companies' promotional material,
read in the light of its effect on ordinary minds, misleads. 5 3 The
standard applies regardless of the literal truth of the statements
made or the semantics involved.'54 Applying this test, the Postal
Service alleges that the firms' advertisements represent the drugs as
v. Beamish, 466 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1972). See generally infra note 151 and accompanying
text. In addition, because the first amendment protects against erroneously imposed prior re-
straints of excessive duration, even in the context of commercial speech, § 3007 injunctions
must extend no longer than necessary for an administrative determination on the merits under
§ 3005. United States v. Athena Prods. Ltd., 654 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1981).
149. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6, United States v. Clifton, Inc.,
No. 81-1134 (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 30, 1981). See generally 39 U.S.C. § 3007 (1980).
150. Usually, when a plaintiff seeks temporary injunctive relief, a balancing of several
elements occurs. The elements include: (1) prevention of irreparable harm to the plaintiff;
(2) clear evidence on the merits; (3) preservation of the status quo; and (4) hardship to either
party should he lose. For a general discussion on injunctive relief, see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 2.10-.12, at 105-34 (1973).
151. United States v. Beamish, 466 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1972). The court in Beamarh noted
that § 3007's controlling substantive standard is restricted to a probable cause showing of a
§ 3005 violation. The reference within § 3007 to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is intended merely "to delineate the procedural mechanics applicable to the hearing on
probable cause, the notice requirements and the form of the order. It does not suggest incorpo-
ration into § 3007 of the common law standards. . . typically required of preliminary injunc-
tions issued on the strength of Rule 65 alone." Id at 806. Courts rationalize the lower
standard utilized in Postal Service actions by noting that, while an injunction may have a
considerable effect on the defendant's business, the government has a paramount interest in
protecting potential consumers irretrievably affected by the defendant's alleged deception. See
United States v. Athena Prods. Ltd., 654 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Beam-
ish, 466 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1972).
152. United States v. Outpost Dev. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 399, 401 (C.D. Cal.), afd, 414
U.S. 1105 (1973); see also United States v. Oriental Nurseries Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Fla.
1980).
153. Peak Laboratories Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1977); accord M.K.S.
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Unique Ideas, Inc. v.
United States, 416 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
154. See Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948). The Supreme Court in
Read noted that "[aidvertisements as a whole may be completely misleading although every
sentence separately considered is literally true. This may be because things are omitted that
should be said, or because advertisements are composed or purposefully printed in such a way
as to mislead." Id at 188. Thus, even though trained and experienced individuals may recog-
nize the statements as obviously false, the statements may still deceive the less experienced.
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Standard Educ., 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937); cf. Donaldson v. Read Mag-
azine Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 189 (1948) (fact that statements may be obviously false to sophisti-
cated individuals not sufficient to bar findings of fraud).
The test is more easily stated than applied because of the requirement that an agency or
reviewing court evaluate an advertisement, not by logical analysis of the parts, but by forming
an impression of the whole in an effort to gauge the overall effect of the advertisement's impact
on an ordinary reader. M.K.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1180, 1184
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
controlled substances; encourage the resale of their products, thereby
implying that no violation of the law is involved; and omit dosage
and risk information, thereby implying the unconditional safety of
the drugs.I55 The Postal Service maintains that the overall effect of
these advertisements misleads, despite their literal accuracy.
The Postal Service has made successful showings of probable
cause t56 on several occasions. 57 In at least four instances, however,
the injunctive orders were lifted and the administrative proceedings
indefinitely suspended when the firms signed consent agreements.
58
Under the terms of these agreements, the companies can continue to
sell look-alikes provided that the companies change the form of the
drugs. The companies must refrain from selling capsules or pills that
are "identical with, substantially indistinguishable from, or colorable
imitations of"" the markings used on controlled substances of an-
other company. The companies can continue to market products im-
printed with the distributors' logo or trademark. The firms agreed
further that none of their advertising, promotional, or other material
would include drawings, photographs, graphics, or other descriptions
of the products and that the agreements would not constitute a de-
fense to or release from the firms' responsibility for violations of any
other statute. 60 The last provision is extremely important, especially
in those states in which statutes prohibit look-alikes substantially
identical to controlled substances.' 6 ' State courts should be able to
155. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, United States v. Clifton, Inc.,
No. 81-1134 (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 30, 1981).
156. The absence of a need to show intent by the companies to deceive the consumer eases
the Postal Service's burden. See M.K.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1180,
1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Unique Ideas, Inc. v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). The omission of this element furthers the purpose of the civil fraud statute to protect
the public against use of the mails for advertisements capable of deceiving the reader. See
Lynch v. Blount, 330 F. Supp. 689, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); H.R. REP. No. 235, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1-5, repriniedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4290, 4292-95.
157. See supra note 134.
158. Bachman, Look-Alike Drugs: "hat's Being Done, Centre Daily Times (State Col-
lege, Pa.), Nov. 13, 1981, at 1; Wilson, 4 Firms toAiter Pitchfor 'Look-Alike'Drugs, Harrisburg
Evening News (Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct. 20, 1981, at 16, col. I.
159. In re Complaint Against Mid South Pharmaceuticals at 1-2, United States v. Mid
South Pharmaceuticals, No. 11/113 (Tenn.) (consent agreement). A "colorable imitation" is
defined to include any markings which, because of visual resemblance, require careful inspec-
tion to distinguish the imitation markings from the genuine ones or which are likely to cause
confusion between the imitation markings and the genuine markings. Visual resemblance in-
cludes shape, color, or other identifying physical characteristics so connected with the genuine
markings or product design that they increase the similarity of the products, thereby increasing
the likelihood of confusion or misidentification. Id at 2.
160. Id at 1. The agreement does not constitute an admission of a violation of § 3005.
Accordingly, breach of the agreement warrants the issuance of an order pursuant to § 3005.
Id at 1, 5; cf. American Image Corp. v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(signing of compromise agreement constituted waiver of right to a hearing on the issues of:
(1) whether the original advertisement contained the alleged false representations; and
(2) whether the subsequent advertisement constituted breach of the agreement).
161. See supra notes 63-64.
determine whether the mere imprint of a logo on a capsule renders
the product substantially identical or not. If the court finds the im-
print insufficient to remove the firm's activities from the proscrip-
tions of the law, it can take action against the company to bring the
products into compliance with the stricter state interpretation.
Although the Postal Service has been successful, the agency's
authority does not extend beyond controlling the mail order aspects
of the look-alike industry. Companies therefore are free to explore
other methods of doing business. Moreover, distributors will find it
relatively easy to comply with the consent agreements because they
will need to make only minor changes in their production and mar-
keting schemes to conform. Presently, it is too early to determine
whether the changes will have an effect on the purchasing public in
the sense of increasing consumer awareness that they are purchasing
noncontrolled substances. Nonetheless, as an indication of effective-
ness, these drug companies have experienced no slowdown in busi-
ness.162 Other agencies, therefore, must take action to cope with the
nonmail elements of the look-alike industry. 163
B. Seizure of Counterfeit Drugs
On September 30, 1981, in a coordinated effort, United States
Marshalls in five states 64 seized over eleven million dollars worth of
look-alike tablets, capsules, and manufacturing equipment. 165  The
Department of Justice and the FDA conducted the seizures pursuant
to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.' 6 6 Federal statutes
make unlawful the manufacture of drugs that copy the trademarks
or other markings clearly identified with another drug product in an
162. Telephone interview with Jack B. Ogun, Admin. Secretary, Pa. Div. of Drug, Device
and Cosmetic Bd. (Jan. 30, 1982).
163. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at 4 (testi-
mony of William T. Murphy, Assistant Chief Inspector, Criminal Investigations, United States
Postal Service).
164. The FDA seizures occurred in Alabama, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Penn-
sylvania. [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) 41,421 (Oct. 12, 1981). The
FDA conducted an additional seizure in January 1982, at a Wisconsin firm that produced
look-alike drugs. Letter from Christopher Smith (Office of Public Affairs, FDA) (Jan. 18,
1982).
165. Trafficking, in Look-Alikes, supra note 17. The inventory of seized items included
fifty million filled capsules, eight hundred thousand tablets, twenty million empty capsules,
and over one million dollars worth of equipment, including capsule printers, tablet presses,
offset rollers, and tablet punches and dies. 1d. The capsules had a street value in excess of ten
million dollars. Wall St. J,, Oct. 2, 1981, at 32, col. 1.
166. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1972). The Act is designed primarily to deal with problems
such as adulteration or misbranding of foods, the safety and efficacy of drugs, and the safety of
cosmetics and therapeutic devices. S. REP. No. 337, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in
1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1895, 1903-04. The term "adulterated" applies to prod-
ucts or materials that are defective, unsafe, filthy, or produced under unsanitary conditions;
misbranded includes false or misleading statements, designs, or pictures in labeling or other
communications that fail to provide required information. Janssen, The U.S. Food and Drug
Law. How It Came,- How It Works, 35 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 132, 137 (1980).
attempt to represent the counterfeit as the imitated product. 16 7
Under pressure from Congress and the public to act against look-
alikes, the FDA seized the drugs and equipment on the basis that
look-alikes are counterfeit drugs.161
Seizure 69 constitutes the FDA's principal enforcement tool'
70
when a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act occurs. The
seizure provisions generally afford "speedy protection"' 7 ' to the pub-
lic from dangerous products or from products utilizing fraudulent or
misleading labeling, pending final determination on the issue of mis-
branding or adulteration. 72 To ensure the necessary prompt action
167. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(2), 331 (prohibited acts).
168. The FDA based the seizures on violations of the counterfeiting provisions because
the manufacturers correctly labeled the drugs. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
The FDA conducted the seizures pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1972). The relevant provi-
sions of this section provide:
(a)(2) The following shall be liable to be proceeded against at any time on libel of
information and condemned in any district court of the United States . . .of which
they are found: (A) Any drug that is a counterfeit drug, (B) Any container of a
counterfeit drug, (C) Any punch, die, plate, stone, labeling, container, or other thing
used or designed for use in making a counterfeit drug or drugs, and (D) Any adulter-
ated or misbranded device.
Id
The Act defines the term "counterfeit drug" as:
[A] drug which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears
the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device, or any like-
ness thereof, of a drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor other than the
person or persons who in fact manufactured, processed, packed or distributed such
drug and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of, or to
have been packed or distributed by, such other drug manufacturer, processor, packer,
or distributor.
1d § 321(g)(2).
Look-alike drugs do not present classic counterfeit drug cases. Counterfeit drugs are ex-
actly what they purport to be--they simply are not manufactured by the company who claims
to manufacture them. Conversely, look-alike drugs are manufactured by the company that
claims to manufacture them, but are not what they purport to be. Bachman, Look-Alike Drugs:
What's Being Done, Centre Daily Times (State College, Pa.) Nov. 13, 1981, at 9. The court's
acceptance of this new interpretation of counterfeit drugs is a valuable step in the FDA's effort
to stop the manufacture of look-alike drugs. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
169. Seizure is a civil action to confiscate a specific lot of goods and to remove the goods
from the channels of commerce. Janssen, The U.S. Food and Drug Law.- How It Came;- How It
Works, 35 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 132, 139 (1980).
170. Swire, FD,4's Multile Seizure Powers.- A Time For Equity, 34 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 244, 246 (1979). Two civil remedies exist for violation of the Act: an action for injunction,
21 U.S.C. § 332 (1972), and an action for seizure of goods, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1972). Seizure
provides the more effective action because of the expedited procedures under the seizure provi-
sions. Upon a probable cause finding that a violation has occurred, the FDA prepares a com-
plaint and then forwards it to the local United States attorney. The United States attorney files
the complaint with the clerk of courts who issues a warrant to the marshall to seize the goods.
The owner need not receive any advance notice.' Id. at 245; FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL supra
note 16, § 7-7, -12; see also infra note 175 and accompanying text (constitutionality of not
providing pre-seizure notice or hearing). The marshall may either place a restraining label on
the goods or remove them from the owner's possession. Either way, the goods are beyond the
owner's control until completion of the case. Swire, FDA 's Multple Seizure Powers.- A Time
for Equity, 34 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 244, 245 (1979).
171. FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL, supra note 16, § 7-2.
172. Ewing v. Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601 (1950); see also Pharmadyne Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Kennedy, 596 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1979) (Congress provided the seizure method for
quick and complete removal of adulterated drugs from the market); United States v. 3963
Bottles More or Less of an Article of Drug Labeled in part: "60 Capsules Lot No. 30019
and to prevent manufacturers and distributors from moving the
goods,'73 firms facing impending seizures have no constitutional
right to advance notice 174 or to a preseizure hearing on the existence
of, or basis for, probable cause. 75  Affording a hearing after the
seizure but before the final administrative order becomes effective
satisfies the requirements of due process. 176 Moreover, the purpose
of protecting consumers makes irrelevant a discussion of whether the
misleading or deception involves willfulness.177 Adulterated or mis-
branded drugs are subject to seizure and condemnation regardless of
the manufacturer's intent.
78
Pursuant to statutory provisions, the FDA inspected several
drug manufacturers and determined that they were manufacturing
counterfeit drugs. 17 9 Because the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act al-
lowed seizure and condemnation of both the counterfeit drugs and
the equipment used to manufacture them, 8 ° United States attorneys
in the targeted states subsequently received complaints for forfeiture.
Enerjol Double Strength," 172 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1959)
(purpose of the Act is to safeguard the consumer from the moment of an article's introduction
into interstate commerce until the moment of delivery to the ultimate consumer). But see infra
notes 193-95 and accompanying text (discussing ulterior motive for FDA seizure actions).
173. Firms facing impending seizures have a preseizure opportunity to move the goods
out of the jurisdiction or to destroy them. FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL, supra note 16, § 7-12.
174. Id § 7-7. In most instances, legal notice serves as notice. Id.
175. Ordinarily, the Constitution demands that a person receive notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to a deprivation of his property. Extraordinary situations, however, may
justify a departure from this rule and permit postponement of the due process requirements of
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Seizure of property for forfeiture to the government
illustrates this situation. United States v. Thirty-six Thousand, One Hundred and Twenty-five
Dollars in United States Currency, 510 F. Supp. 303, 306 (E.D. La. 1980). Thus, when a
situation threatens harm to the public and the private interest infringed upon is deemed less
important, the Government may take summary action pending a later hearing. Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.10 (1970). Cases in which courts upheld summary action include:
Ewing v. Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled vitamin product); Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1943) (adoption of wartime price regulation); North Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of food not fit for human use); R.A.
Holman & Co. v. S.E.C., 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962) (sus-
pension of exemption from stock registration requirement).
The seizure action secures an important interest of the government and the general public,
i.e., protection of the public from dangerous or mislabeled products. See supra note 172 and
accompanying text. In providing the seizure action, Congress weighed the potential injury to
the public from misbranded drugs against the injury caused to the owner of the articles by
temporary interference with the product's distribution and decided in favor of the speedy,
preventive device of seizure. Ewing v. Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601 (1950).
. 176. Ewing v. Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598 (1950); see United States v. Thirty-six
Thousand, One Hundred and Twenty-five Dollars in United States Currency, 510 F. Supp.
303, 306-07 (E.D. La. 1980).
177. United States v. 30 Cases, More or Less, Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread, 93
F. Supp. 764, 769 (S.D. Iowa 1950); see also United States v. 75 Cases, More or Less, Each
Containing 24 Jars of Peanut Butter, Labeled in part (Jars): "Top Notch Brand," 146 F.2d 124
(4th Cir. 1944).
178. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
179. Letter from Thomas Scarlett (Chief Counsel, FDA) to John S. Martin, Jr. (United
States Attorney in New York) (Sept. 18, 1981) (discussing background of look-alikes and
FDA's plan of action).
180. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
The filing of the complaints only on FDA notification preserved the
element of surprise and aided in coordinating the seizures.' 8' The
vast quantity of drugs and equipment seized evidences the success of
these proceedings. 82
To avoid condemnation of their products and equipment, man-
ufacturers are negotiating consent agreements similar to those uti-
lized by the Postal Service.'8  The agreements 84 would restrain the
manufacture, distribution or promotion of. (1) any drug that bears
the identifying mark of another manufacturer and thereby falsely
purports to be the product of that manufacturer; and (2) any drug
whose size, shape, or color imitates a drug that contains a controlled
substance.' 85 The manufacturer also must file semi-annual reports
with the FDA and permit FDA inspections of the facilities.'86 In
consideration, compliance with the agreement allows the manufac-
turer to have his equipment promptly returned. 87
The success of the FDA seizures extends beyond protection of
the public's interest in avoiding economic or physical injuries. A
complaint filed under the statutory seizure provisions does not act
only to condemn goods, it also requests a declaration of the status of
the goods."88 As a practical matter, seizure actions serve as test cases
to crystallize and resolve regulatory disputes in a forum familiar to
the FDA.'89 In the action against look-alike drugs, the ultimate suc-
181. Letter from Thomas Scarlett (Chief Counsel, FDA), to John S. Martin, Jr. (United
States Attorney in New York) (Sept. 18, 1981) (discussing background of look-alikes and
FDA's plan of action).
182. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
183. Trafficking in Look-Alikes, supra note 17. One manufacturer already has signed a
consent agreement. Two others are negotiating. Id The owner of seized goods has several
alternatives: he can do nothing, in which case the court will dispose of the goods; he can
contest the action and proceed with a trial; or he can request permission to bring the goods into
compliance with the law. Janssen, The U.S. Food and Drug Law." How It Came, How It
Works, 35 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 132, 139 (1980).
184. Conceivably, a firm may experience both Postal Service and FDA proceedings and,
consequently, may sign several consent agreements. See supra note 160 and accompanying
text. This situation occurred in United States v. 3963 Bottles More or Less of an Article of
Drug Labeled in part: "60 Capsules Lot No. 30019 Enerjol Double Strength," 172 F. Supp.
470 (N.D. Ill. 1958), afd, 265 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1959). The petitioner argued that, in view of
the Postal Service proceedings and agreement with that agency concerning the identical prod-
uct and labels involved in the FDA suit, the libel subjected him to a "multiplicity of actions"
and "unjust harassment." Id at 471. In ruling against the petitioner, the court held that res
judicata applies only after an actual adjudication of the same issues in a prior proceeding.
This instance involved different issues. The offense of using the mails to defraud and the
offense of introducing misbranded drugs into interestate commerce were not the same; hence,
resjudicata did not apply. Id at 471-72.
185. Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction and Condemnation at 2-9, United States v.
Articles or Drug in Bulk and in Package Form Resembling Controlled Substance Drugs, No.
81-1127 (M.D. Pa. filed Jan. 6, 1982).
186. Id at 5-6.
187. Id at 7.
188. FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL, supra note 16, § 7-4. Because of the FDA's desire for
judicial declaration of the status of seized goods, owners cannot unilaterally terminate a case
by offering to consent to destruction of the goods. Id § 7-12.
189. Id § 7-4; see also Swire, FD,4's Multile Seizure Powers.- A Timefor Equity, 34 FOOD
cess of the seizures lies in the recognition by courts that look-alike
drugs are counterfeit substances. Prior to these decisions, the FDA
could take no action against look-alike manufacturers because of
their compliance with the FDA's labeling requirements. Now, under
the recognition that look-alikes are counterfeit drugs, the courts have
opened the door for further FDA seizure actions based on the newly
declared status of look-alike drugs.
The FDA has the capacity to stop national distribution of a
product outright by filing multiple seizure actions in many geograph-
ical locations at once.' 90 Unfortunately, because of limited FDA re-
sources t91 and the nationwide scope of the problem, a large-scale
action probably will not occur. The FDA's focus on the manufactur-
ing level of the look-alike industry also limits the agency's enforce-
ment authority.' 92 Consequently, the street abuse aspects of the
problem remain outside the FDA's normal enforcement activities
and another governmental agency must resolve these problems.
C The Drug Enforcement Administration: A Toothless Agency
The work of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) sup-
plements the FDA's jurisdiction for the street abuse aspects of nar-
cotics and dangerous drug products.'93 The Controlled Substances
Act 94 authorizes the DEA to control abusable drugs to prevent their
use in illegal ways.' 95 Although the FDA controls all drugs for
safety and efficacy, the DEA has distribution control powers over
drugs placed on drug control schedules, ie., controlled substances.
96
This limitation on the DEA's authority renders the agency powerless
to deal directly with street level abuse of look-alike drugs because
the substances are not scheduled controlled drugs.'9 7
Although the DEA cannot take direct action against look-alikes,
the agency has a responsibility to combat drug abuse and considers
look-alike drugs one facet of the nationwide drug abuse problem.' 98
DRUG CosM. L.J. 244 (1979) (FDA will bring multiple seizure actions as test cases to enforce
the agency's view of the law, even when an appellate court has ruled to the contrary).
190. FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL, supra note 16, § 7-3.
191. Legal 'Look-Alike' Drugs Pose Enforcement Problems, U.S. MEDICINE, Nov. 1, 1981,
at -.
192. [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) 1 41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982).
193. FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL, supra note 16, § 24-12.
194. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1981).
195. FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL, supra note 16, § 24-12.
196. Id For a listing of substances scheduled as controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 812 (1981).
197. [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) 41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982); Legal
Look-Alike Drugs Pose Enforcement Problems, U.S. MEDICINE, Nov. 1, 1981, at -.
198. Prefatory Note, supra note 28; [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH)
41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982) (DEA considers the situation similar to that involving drug parapherna-
lia and is concerned that promotion of look-alikes as legal substances gives the appearance
that the government condones the use of recreational drugs); see also Trafficking in Look-
Under the auspices of this policy, the DEA adopted a six-point pro-
gram designed to stem the manufacture and sale of look-alike drugs.
Basically, the program calls for: (1) interagency cooperation;
(2) publication of the look-alike problem; (3) encouragement of par-
ent and community support; (4) state legislative action; (5) support of
the legitimate pharmaceutical industry; and (6) a model act.' 99
The heart of the DEA initiative, the Model Imitation Controlled
Substances Act,2"° is intended to eliminate the look-alike problem
through the use of regulations and criminal and civil penalties. The
term "imitation controlled substance" acts as the key to the Model
Act.21' The Model Act defines "imitation controlled substance" as
"a substance that is not a controlled substance, which by dosage unit
appearance (including color, shape, size, and markings), or by repre-
sentations made, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
substance is a controlled substance. 20 2 The Model Act also pro-
vides factors for court consideration in determining whether a sub-
stance is an imitation controlled substance for use in those rare
instances when the appearance insufficiently establishes that the
drug is such a substance.20 3
The Model Act makes the manufacture, distribution, use, or
possession with intent to distribute or use an imitation controlled
substance unlawful.2°  The Act further prohibits individuals from
placing, in any publication, an advertisement with reasonable
knowledge that the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the
distribution of imitation controlled substances. 205  The Model Act
leaves to each state the specific penalty for violating each of the pro-
scribed acts and also allows the states to provide for civil forfeiture
of imitation controlled substances.
20 6
According to the DEA, many existing and draft state acts over-
Alikes, supra note 17 (DEA considers that the distribution and sale of look-alikes, like drug
paraphernalia, encourages and contributes to drug abuse and drug profiteering).
199. Trafficking in Look-Alikes, supra note 17; see also Hearings, supra note 8, at 5-6
(statement of Marion Hambrick, DEA); [New Matters] FOOD DRUG COSM. L. REP. (CCH)
41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982) (summarizing the DEA's six point program).
200. MODEL IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 1-4 (DEA 1981).
201. Id at § i(d).
202. Id
203. Id The elements for court consideration include: (1) statements by an owner, or one
in control of the substance, concerning the nature, use or effect of the substance; (2) statements
made to the recipient that the substance may be resold for an inordinate profit; (3) packaging
that is normally used for illicit controlled substances; (4) evasive tactics used by the owner, or
one in control of the substance, to avoid detection by law enforcement authorities; (5) prior
convictions related to controlled substances or fraud; and (6) proximity of the substance to
controlled. substances. Id
204. Id. § 2. Furthermore, under the Model Act, any person eighteen years or older who
distributes an imitation controlled substance to a minor commits an aggravated crime. Id
205. Id The Model Act provides immunity for persons registered under the Controlled
Substances Act who manufacture, distribute or possess imitation controlled substances for use
as placebos by registered practitioners in the course of professional practice or research. Id
206. Id §3.
emphasize the representations made by sellers of the substances. 20 7
To remedy this flaw, the DEA's Model Act places emphasis on the
"look-alike" nature of most of the substances involved.20 The pro-
vision of both criminal and civil penalties further strengthens the
Act. The use of both penalties will make enforcement under the
Model Act more effective and comprehensive than enforcement
under present state statutes, which provide only criminal penal-
ties.2" 9 The DEA hopes that the Model Imitation Controlled Sub-
stances Act will serve as a guide for states that desire to take
legislative action against look-alikes °
The DEA also achieved limited success in its effort to encourage
action by the legitimate pharmaceutical industry. Three major man-
ufacturers of empty capsules restricted their sales to look-alike man-
ufacturer s and others have indicated a willingness to cooperate. 2t'
The resulting lack of capsules already has begun to affect the look-
alike distribution chain because some distributors have reported that
they no longer can obtain "Black Beauty" or "Yellows" capsules.
212
DEA efforts are limited to mere encouragement of and support
for governmental and community action against look-alikes. To al-
leviate this problem, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime is
considering whether Congress should amend the Controlled Sub-
stances Act to give the DEA authority over counterfeit, noncontrol-
led substances." 3 The DEA opposes this move, contending that the
agency's structure would ineffectively deal with the look-alike prob-
lem and that additional responsibilities would force the DEA to re-
examine its "balance of priorities."2t 4 Until resolution of this
dispute, the DEA has no power to act directly against street dealers
of look-alikes and another link in the distribution chain continues to
escape prosecution.
V. The Need for Federal Legislation
The manufacture and distribution of look-alike drugs has be-
207. Comment to MODEL IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, (DEA) (Oct. 1981).
See generally supra notes 63-64 (state statutory provisions).
208. Comment to MODEL IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, (DEA) (Oct. 1981).
The Model Act's failure to require that a violation be knowing or intentional illustrates one
flaw. Omission of this requirement may subject the Model Act to criticism on void for vague-
ness grounds. See generally supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text (discussion of the void
for vagueness doctrine).
209. See supra note 69.
210. Prefatory Note, supra note 28.
211. Massey, Fake 'Speed' Causes Almost as Much Fear as the Real Thing, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 8, 1981, at i, col. 4.
212. Trafficking in Look-Alikes, supra note 17.
213. Legal "Look-Alike' Drugs Pose Enforcement Problems, U.S. MEDICINE, Nov. I, 1981,
at -.
214. Id at -. (DEA's chief counsel asked "which heroin or cocaine cases do we pass
over").
come a nationwide industry. The mail order and street abuse aspects
of the problem affect even states that do not house either manufac-
turing plants or wholesale distributors. Moreover, manufacturers
and distributors prohibited from doing business in those states with
look-alike drugs legislation only need move to a state lacking such
legislation to continue their operations. Obviously, the current
piecemeal, state-by-state efforts will not eliminate the look-alike in-
dustry,2" 5 for while the problem may diminish in one state it will
increase in others.
21 6
The variety of statutory provisions in those states that have en-
acted legislation has created additional enforcement problems.
2 7
The variety makes states either more or less attractive from the in-
dustry's perspective. For instance, each state has established differ-
ent penalties, some of which provide no deterrent effect because of
their leniency.218  Similarly, the statutory definition of look-alikes
varies among the states.219 A substance considered a look-alike in
one state may not be so recognized in another state. Consequently,
manufacturers or distributors forced out of one state have the option
of renewing business again either in a state lacking legislation or in a
state with legislation favorable to the industry.
220
Rather than relying on state efforts to individually test solutions
to the look-alike problem, a uniform law applicable to all states
would most appropriately solve the problem. Federal legislation can
foster uniformity in definition, penalties, and enforcement.22' Al-
215. Hearings, supra note 8, at 5 (statement by Michael A. O'Pake, Pa. State Senator).
216. Id. The movement of distributors to states without look-alike legislation may pro-
vide one explanation for the high number of distributors in Pennsylvania, whose neighboring
states of Delaware and Maryland enacted laws to ban look-alikes within their states.
217. See supra note 60.
218. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 63-64.
220. Cf. Hearings, supra note 8, at 5-6 (statement of Michael A. O'Pake, Pa. State Sena-
tor). Senator O'Pake of the Pennsylvania Senate testified that unanimous adoption by the
states of a Model Act would eliminate some of the problems. Those states, however, that have
enacted laws will deal only reluctantly with the issue again. Those states that do adopt the
Model Act will do so gradually; meanwhile, look-alike manufacturers and distributors will
have no difficulty staying "one jump ahead" of the Model Act. Id
221. Enactment of federal legislation to deal with the look-alike problem may raise the
question whether the federal legislation will preempt the laws of those states that enacted or
proposed legislation. The supremacy clause, UNITED STATES CONST. art. VI, assures that
when federal and state jurisdictions collide, the federal system will prevail. The preemption
doctrine invalidates state laws that conflict with federal laws. The doctrine also defines the
situations in which states may legislate or regulate within areas governed broadly by federal
legislation. FOOD AND DRUG MANUAL, supra note 16, § 25-8. Whether a federal statute
preempts a challenged state action depends on whether the state statute "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); accord DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976);
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 165 (1963). Thus, state action
will fall when Congress has "unmistakably... ordained" that its enactments are to regulate a
segment of commerce. Id at 142. The result obtains whether the congressional command is
explicitly stated in the statutory language or implicitly contained in the statute's structure and
purpose. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Thus, when federal and state
though any federal law doubtless Will reflect the same inadequacies
as current state laws,222 a uniform law would nevertheless prevent
movement of look-alike firms among states and would provide con-
sistent guidelines to aid enforcement officials. Federal legislation
will not eliminate the industry because manufacturers and distribu-
tors can alter their products sufficiently to remain outside the scope
of the law. Nonetheless, the alterations may create a recognizable
difference in the substance. A purchaser then would have the option
of refusing to buy the product or of refusing to pay a black market
price for a product recognizable as an over-the-counter drug. Either
option will reduce profits and, through the attendant risk of criminal
prosecution, provide a disincentive to engage in the industry.
Responsibility for enforcing any new federal look-alike legisla-
tion should rest with the agencies that already have authority to reg-
ulate the nation's drug problem-the FDA and the DEA. Currently,
neither agency would willingly assume the responsibility of enforc-
ing a new drug law, contending that they do not have the resources
to efficiently handle the problem. 223  Despite their reluctance, both
agencies have an established enforcement mechanism that makes
them the most appropriate forums for enforcement of any new law.
The FDA demonstrated an ability to successfully deal with look-
statutes directly contradict each other on their face making compliance with both a literal
impossibility, the federal statute will prevail. Similarly, state action will be invalidated, even
though not facially contradictory, when the state statute effectively discourages conduct that
the federal action seeks to encourage or, conversely, to encourage conduct whose absence
would aid in effectuation of the federal scheme. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 6-24, at 377 (1978).
Furthermore, a state statute will fall whether or not a conflict exists with a federal law if
Congress has decided to occupy the field for the federal government. The field may be one in
which the dominance of the federal interest precludes state regulation, as with foreign affairs
or national defense. Downey, Laboratories or Puppets." The Challenge ofFederal Preemption of
State Legislation, 34 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 334, 346 (1979). Occupation of a field also may
be shown by the degree of regulation of the federal scheme. The less comprehensive the
scheme, the more likely that courts will uphold state legislation. Conversely, when a multiplic-
ity of federal regulations govern a field, the pervasiveness of the regulation will help to sustain
the conclusion that Congress intended to control the field exclusively. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 384-85 (1978).
Nevertheless, courts will sanction state regulations that supplement federal efforts as long
as the state law will not significantly hinder compliance with the letter and effectuation of the
purpose of the federal law. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Air Lines,
Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1963); see also McDermott v. State of Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133
(1913) (state has authority to make regulations consistent with federal law for the further pro-
tection of citizens against impure and misbranded food and drugs).
Because a variety of considerations determine whether federal legislation preempts a state
law, the status of current look-alike legislation must await the enactment and judicial scrutiny
of any federal legislation designed to eliminate or control the look-alike drug situation.
For a thorough discussion of the preemption doctrine, see Downey, Laboratories or Pup-
pets? The Challenge of Federal Preemption ofState Legislation, 34 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 334
(1979).
222. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
223. Legal 'Look-Alike' Drugs Pose Enforcement Problems, U.S. MEDICINE, Nov. 1, 1981,
at -.
alikes under the counterfeit drug provisions 224 and, as an added en-
forcement measure, the FDA could assign distinctive identifying
characteristics to over-the-counter drugs such as size, shape, color,
and insignia.225 Because the FDA focuses mainly on the manufac-
turing level, the DEA should have the authority to enforce the law
on the street level. Amending the Controlled Substances Act to give
the DEA authority over counterfeit noncontrolled substances can ac-
complish this result. 226 Cooperation among federal and state gov-
ernments would alleviate the concern over lack of agency resources.
Thus, as an increasing number of states secure adequate laws, en-
forcement personnel, and vigorous enforcement, the state role in
control of the look-alike industry, particularly in control of intrastate
drug traffic, would increase 227 and would relieve the burden placed
upon the federal agencies.
VI. Conclusion
Trafficking in look-alike drugs is a relatively recent phenome-
non in this country. The rapid growth of the industry has interfered
with enforcement of existing drug laws and has created serious
health hazards. Various state and federal efforts taken to control the
industry have yielded limited, short-term success. Because of diffi-
culty in statutorily defining the term "look-alike," manufacturers
and distributors merely alter the appearance of their drugs to remain
outside the reach of state laws. At the federal level, Postal Service
actions reach only the mail order aspect of the industry, while the
FDA, which has had success on the manufacturing level, remains
powerless to attack the problem on the street level.
Piecemeal state legislation will ineffectively eliminate look-
alikes because manufacturers and distributors move from state to
state. The need exists for a uniform federal law to deal with the
problem on a national level. Arguably, a federal law will reflect the
same weaknesses as the current state laws. Manufacturers, distribu-
tors, and dealers will continue to market their high-profit products in
forms sufficiently modified to enable them to escape prosecution
under the law. Nevertheless, the industry depends upon a mystique
capable of deceiving the public and, while federal legislation may
not eliminate the industry, such a law would strip away the facade.
224. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
225. [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) 41,472 (Aug. 2, 1982). See also
Hearings Before Special Subcomm. on Look-Alike Drugs, supra note 28, at 3 (testimony of
William A. Helm, Mifflin Co., Pa., Dist. Atty.) (the problem would evaporate if each pill or
capsule was a plain, white pill or capsule of only one color; or if each capsule was marked with
the words "contains caffeine" or "not a controlled substance" or other appropriate legend).
226. Legal "Look-Alike'Drugs Pose Enforcement Problems, U.S. MEDICINE, Nov. 1, 1981.
227. See generally S. REP. No. 337, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1895.
Consumers then, recognizing the product as an over-the-counter
drug, can either refuse to make a purchase or refuse to pay the black
market price. Either way, manufacturers' and distributors' profits
will be reduced. Taking the profit out of a profit motivated industry
may provide the ultimate solution.
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